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The North Carolina Racial Justice Act provided that a defendant 
may state a claim for relief based on statistical evidence of 
discrimination in capital charging and sentencing decisions. This 
paper reports the methodology and findings of a McCleskey-
style study of capital charging and sentencing decisions in North 
Carolina between 1990 and 2009. The findings reported here 
show that white victim cases and black defendant/black victim 
cases pull strongly in the opposite direction in these decisions. 
The primary model analyzing death sentencing among all death-
eligible cases shows that-even after controlling for multiple 
measures of culpability-cases with at least one white victim face 
odds of receiving a death sentence that are 2.17 times the odds 
faced by all other cases (p < .001). The evidence further suggests 
that this effect arises primarily in the charging decisions of 
prosecutors, where these state officials systematically disregard 
cases in which black defendants kill black victims. The odds of a 
black defendant/black victim case advancing to a capital trial are 
2.6 times lower than the odds faced by all other cases (p < .001). 
Juries were significantly less likely to impose a death sentence in 
the few white defendant/black victim cases (odds ratio 0.19, p < 
.05). When these cases are excluded, the analysis of penalty trial 
decisions does not identify race effects. We do not find evidence 
of discrimination against black defendants generally or against 
black defendants who kill white victims specifically. 
Ultimately, although this study refines the methodology used in 
previous studies of charging and sentencing in North Carolina, 
its results echo their conclusions. Our findings are also largely 
consistent with the broad trends identified in capital charging and 
sentencing studies across many jurisdictions in the 25 years since 
McCleskey. This lends credibility to our conclusion that despite 
ongoing protestations to the contrary, race plays a significant 
factor in charging and sentencing decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The North Carolina General Assembly passed the North 
Carolina Racial Justice Act (the “RJA”) in August 2009.1 This act 
provided that every person then sentenced to death in North Carolina 
and any person facing a potential death sentence in the future “may 
seek relief	.	.	.	upon the ground that racial considerations played a 
 
 1.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§	15A-2010 to 2012 (2009) (repealed 2013). 
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significant part in the decision to seek or impose a death sentence.”2 
If a court found race to be a significant factor, the law required the 
court to convert a death sentence to a life sentence without parole or, 
for pending cases, to order that death not be sought.3 The RJA 
provided that in stating a claim a defendant may rely on statistical 
evidence of race of defendant discrimination, race of victim 
discrimination, or racial discrimination in jury selection.4 
This study sought to analyze, as rigorously as possible, the 
influence of discrimination based on the race of defendants or victims 
on capital charging and sentencing in North Carolina. At the bottom 
line, even after a complex analysis of relative culpability, the 
conclusions of this study echo and refine those of previous studies of 
charging and sentencing in North Carolina.5 They also conform to the 
broad trends identified in the literature based on studies across many 
jurisdictions.6 The analysis here strongly suggests that in death-
eligible murder cases with at least one white victim, defendants are 
more likely to be sentenced to death than all other cases. We find that 
this results primarily from prosecutorial disregard at the charging 
stage of death-eligible murders in which black defendants kill only 
black victims. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds in six sections. Part I of the 
paper presents key components of North Carolina capital punishment 
law, including the death penalty statutes and procedures and details 
of the RJA. We then review previous studies on capital charging and 
sentencing in North Carolina in Part II. Parts III and IV detail the 
 
 2.  Id. §	15A-2012(a)(3). The North Carolina General Assembly repealed the Racial 
Justice Act in 2013. Act of June 19, 2013, ch. 154, sec. 5(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 368, 372 
(repealing the RJA). 
 3.  §	15A-2012(a)(3) (repealed 2013). 
 4.  Id. §	15A-2011(b) (repealed 2013). 
 5.  See, e.g., SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: 
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 35 (1989); BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH 
A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF DEATH PENALTY 93 (1987); Michael R. Radelet & 
Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Death Sentencing in North Carolina, 1980–2007, 89 N.C. L. 
REV. 2119, 2119–20 (2011). 
 6.  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY 
SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5–6 (1990) 
(concluding, based on an evaluation synthesis of 28 capital charging and sentencing 
studies, that race of victim influenced decisions at all stages of the criminal justice system 
process); David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the 
Administration of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special 
Emphasis on the Post-1990 Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 194, 202–26 (2003) (reaching the 
same conclusion based on research conducted after 1990); Catherine M. Grosso et al., 
Race Discrimination and the Death Penalty: An Empirical and Legal Overview, in 
AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 525, 525 (James Acker & Robert 
Bohm eds. 2014) (reviewing the literature up to 2013 and reaching the same conclusion). 
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study design and implementation procedures. Our analysis is 
presented in Part V in three subsections. The first subsection presents 
our findings with respect to the overall risk of receiving a death 
sentence. This analysis combines all decisions into one question: did 
the defendant receive a death sentence? The second and third 
subsections separate the decisions into stages-focusing first on the 
prosecutorial decision to bring a death-eligible murder to a capital 
trial and, then, on the jury decision to impose a death sentence at the 
penalty trial. Each section of Part V begins by presenting unadjusted 
analyses, then adjusted analyses that control only for the number of 
statutory aggravating factors present in the case, and finally three 
fully-controlled logistic regression models. The first model includes 
only those control variables directly related to the culpability of the 
crime or the offender. The second and third consider the impact of 
personal and context variables, in sequence, on the findings. 
Part VI presents a brief discussion of our conclusion that race 
was a significant factor in charging and sentencing decisions in North 
Carolina capital cases between 1990 and 2009. In particular, we 
conclude that defendants in white victim cases faced a significantly 
heightened risk of receiving a death sentence, and that part of this 
risk is explained by prosecutors’ significant disregard of crimes that 
happen within the black community. 
As noted above, this paper reports the methodology and findings 
of a McCleskey-style study of capital charging and sentencing 
decisions in North Carolina between 1990 and 2009.7 The next section 
provides essential background information concerning North 
Carolina’s law of capital punishment. 
I.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The RJA expressly allowed claims to be filed on the basis of 
statistical evidence of discrimination in prosecutorial decisions to seek 
a death sentence, as well as in jury decisions to impose a death 
sentence.8 Accordingly, the charging and sentencing study presented 
here sought to understand the role of race in the North Carolina 
criminal justice system, as well as in the specific decision-making 
behind seeking or imposing a death sentence. Any such study 
requires an understanding of the capital charging and sentencing law 
in the relevant jurisdiction. 
 
 7.  Details on the McCleskey-style methodology are provided below. See infra notes 
75–77. 
 8.  §	15A-2011(b) (repealed 2013). 
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A. North Carolina Capital Punishment Law 
In North Carolina, a defendant must be guilty of first-degree 
murder to be eligible for the death penalty.9 At one time, North 
Carolina sought to limit prosecutorial discretion by requiring a 
prosecutor to seek the death penalty in every statutorily death-
eligible case.10 The legislature removed this requirement in 2001 by 
granting prosecutors discretion to try death-eligible, first-degree 
murder cases without seeking the death penalty.11 As in every other 
jurisdiction, a North Carolina prosecutor has discretion to seek or 
decline to seek the death penalty in a death-eligible murder case. 
Prosecutors also have the authority to bring the case to trial or to 
engage in plea negotiations.12 
If the defendant is convicted of first-degree murder, the jury 
hears evidence on the presence of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances and must consider four elements: (1) whether any 
statutory aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt; 
(2)	whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to outweigh any 
aggravating circumstances found in step one; (3)	whether aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances; and (4)	after 
weighing the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating 
circumstances together, if the aggravators are sufficiently substantial 
so that the defendant should be sentenced to death.13 The jury 
decision to impose a death sentence must be unanimous.14 If the 
 
 9.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	14-17(a) (2015). The statute codifies four types of first-degree 
murder: (1) Murder perpetrated by means of a weapon of mass destruction; (2) Murder 
perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or torture; (3) Willful, 
premeditated, and deliberate killing; and (4) Murder committed in the perpetration or 
attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, 
or other felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon (felony murder). 
Id. 
 10.  See State v. Case, 330 N.C. 161, 163, 410 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1991) (stating that “if our 
law permitted the district attorney to exercise discretion as to when an aggravating 
circumstance supported by the evidence would or would not be submitted, our death 
penalty scheme would be arbitrary and, therefore, unconstitutional”); see also Seth Kotch 
& Robert P. Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and the 
Death Penalty in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2079–80 (2010) (discussing the 
unique attempt of North Carolina to limit the discretion of prosecutors). 
 11.  §	15A-2004(a). 
 12.  Rule 24 of the North Carolina General Rules of Practice for Superior and District 
Courts requires that a pretrial conference be held in every capital case where the parties 
consider the existence of evidence of aggravating circumstances and the appointment of 
assistant counsel for indigent defendants when the State is seeking the death penalty. N.C. 
SUP. & DIST. CT. R. 24. 
 13.  §	15A-2000(b). Before 1995, the jury chose between death and life. Act of Mar. 
23, 1994, ch. 21, sec. 1, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 59, 59. 
 14.  §	15A-1237(b). 
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jurors cannot agree, the statute requires that the judge impose a 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole.15 
B. The North Carolina Racial Justice Act 
Passage of the RJA provided the impetus for this study. The 
RJA opened by declaring, “No person shall be subject to or given a 
sentence of death or shall be executed pursuant to any judgment that 
was sought or obtained on the basis of race.”16 A defendant may 
establish a claim by showing that race was “a significant factor in 
decisions to seek or impose the sentence of death in the county, the 
prosecutorial district, the judicial division, or the State at the time the 
death sentence was sought or imposed.”17 The RJA expressly 
identified statistical evidence as a type of evidence that is “relevant” 
to establishing a claim under the act.18 Such a claim may allege 
discrimination in charging or sentencing decisions on the basis of the 
race of the defendant, the race of the victim, or discrimination in the 
exercise of peremptory challenges during jury selection.19 The claim 
must assert that the discrimination can be documented “irrespective 
of statutory factors.”20 The RJA applied retroactively to defendants 
sentenced to death at the time the act became law, but required that 
any person under a death sentence at that time file any motion under 
the act “within one year of the effective date of this act.”21 Governor 
 
 15.  Id. §	15A-2000(b). 
 16.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-2010 (2009) (repealed 2013). Kentucky is the only other 
jurisdiction in the United States to have passed acts similar to the RJA. KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §	532.300 (LexisNexis 2016) (current through Ch. 133 of 2016 Legislative Session). 
The RJA differed in important ways from the Kentucky statutory scheme. The Kentucky 
law requires that a defendant prove that “racial considerations played a significant part in 
the decision to seek a death sentence in his or her case.” Id. §	532.300(4). While the 
Kentucky law is silent as to the appropriate geographic scope of inquiry, it has been 
understood to require that any proof of discrimination come from the defendant’s county. 
See David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of 
Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1411, 1467 n.215 (2004) (explaining the basis for this understanding). In addition, the 
Kentucky law requires the defendant to prove that race “was the basis of the decision to 
seek the death penalty” and to prove it “by clear and convincing evidence.” §	532.300(5). 
 17.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-2011(a) (repealed 2013). 
 18.  Id. §	15A-2011(b) (repealed 2013). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. This section may refer to the aggravating circumstances enumerated in the 
N.C. Code. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-2000(e)(1)–(11) (2015). These factors intend to state 
characteristics of a murder that identify it as deserving heightened punishment. See, e.g., 
§	15A-2000(e)(1) (“The capital felony was committed by a person lawfully incarcerated.”); 
§	15A-2000(e)(9) (“The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”). 
 21.  Act of Aug. 6, 2009, ch. 464, sec. 2, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 1213, 1215 (repealed 
2013) (“This act is effective when it becomes law and applies retroactively. For persons 
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Beverly Purdue signed the act into law on August 11, 2009, and it 
became effective immediately.22 
Approximately 150 defendants from North Carolina’s death row 
asserted RJA claims before the statutory period expired on August 
10, 2010.23 Four defendants received relief in two proceedings under 
the RJA based on claims that race was a significant factor in jury 
selection.24 The North Carolina General Assembly amended the RJA 
in 2012,25 and repealed it in 2013.26 
II.  PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON CAPITAL CHARGING AND 
SENTENCING IN NORTH CAROLINA 
Scholars continue to study the role of race in capital punishment 
in different jurisdictions at a steady pace.27 This research suggests that 
the influence of the race of the defendant on capital charging and 
sentencing practices has diminished over the decades since Furman v. 
Georgia.28 While studies in some jurisdictions have identified 
discrimination on the basis of the defendant’s race, findings of such 
discrimination have become rare.29 In contrast, studies 
 
under a death sentence imposed before the effective date of this act, motions under this 
act shall be filed within one year of the effective date of this act; for persons whose death 
sentence is imposed on or after the effective date of this act, motions shall be filed as 
provided in this act.”). 
 22.  Perdue Signs Racial Justice Act, WRAL (Aug. 11, 2009), http://www.wral.com
/news/state/story/5769609/ [https://perma.cc/VCK4-ZUP2]. 
 23.  §	15A-1420(c) (setting out the procedures for a motion for appropriate relief). 
 24.  Order Granting Motions for Appropriate Relief at 2, North Carolina v. Golphin 
et al., 97-CRS-47314-15 (Sup. Ct. N.C. Dec. 13, 2012); Order Granting Motion for 
Appropriate Relief at 44–46, North Carolina v. Robinson, 91-CRS-23143 (Sup. Ct. N.C. 
Apr. 20, 2012). The State appealed both decisions to the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina. The Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded both decisions for new 
hearings on Dec. 18, 2015. The court found procedural errors in each decision. North 
Carolina v. Robinson, 368 N.C. 596, 596–97, 780 S.E.2d 151, 152 (2015); North Carolina v. 
Augustine et al., 368 N.C. 594, 594–95, 780 S.E.2d 552, 552 (2015). 
 25.  Act of July 2, 2012, ch. 136, sec. 3, §	15A-2011, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 471, 471–73 
(amending the RJA, which was repealed in 2013). 
 26.  Act of June 19, 2013, ch. 154, sec. 5(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 368, 372 (repealing 
the RJA). 
 27.  See Grosso et al., supra note 6, at app. A. 
 28.  408 U.S. 238, 238 (1972) (per curiam) (declaring the death penalty 
unconstitutional when arbitrarily or inconsistently applied); see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES 
PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5–6 (1990) (concluding that, based on an evaluation 
synthesis of 28 capital charging and sentencing studies, the race of victim was found to 
influence decisions at all stages of the criminal justice system process); Baldus & 
Woodworth, supra note 6, at 202–26 (reaching the same conclusion based on research 
conducted after 1990). 
 29.  See Grosso et al., supra note 6, at 530–31. 
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overwhelmingly conclude that the race of the victim continues to 
influence capital charging and sentencing.30 Most studies find that a 
defendant who killed at least one white victim is more likely to be 
charged with a capital crime and more likely to be sentenced to 
death.31 
Studies of capital punishment in North Carolina parallel national 
trends. Early laws in North Carolina expressly made a wide range of 
crimes death eligible.32 Pre-Furman studies conducted in North 
Carolina documented strong race effects based on the race of both 
the defendant and the victim.33 Studies completed after Furman, 
however, frequently document race-of-victim discrimination but no 
independent discrimination based on the race of the defendant.34 
Two teams of scholars published studies examining the influence 
of race on capital punishment in North Carolina in the 1980s.35 First, 
Barry Nakell and Kenneth Hardy studied the outcomes of 661 cases 
in North Carolina in the twelve months following June 1, 1977.36 
Researchers collected and coded data from the state medical 
examiner, court records, police reports, and interviews with 
prosecutors and defense attorneys.37 After controlling for the quality 
of the evidence and the seriousness of the offense, they concluded 
that “defendants in cases with white victims were six times more 
likely to be found guilty of first-degree murder than defendants in 
cases with nonwhite victims.”38 
Samuel Gross and Robert Mauro included North Carolina in an 
eight-state study.39 In North Carolina, the scholars used the Federal 
 
 30.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 31.  See Grosso et al., supra note 6, at 537. 
 32.  Hugo Adam Bedau, General Introduction, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY 1, 6–7 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1967) (listing the North 
Carolina crimes with a mandatory death sentence as of 1837). 
 33.  See Radelet & Pierce, supra note 5, at 2130–32 (reviewing the literature). 
 34.  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY 
SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5–6 (1990) 
(concluding based on an evaluation synthesis of 28 capital charging and sentencing studies 
that race of victim was found to influence decisions at all stages of the criminal justice 
system process); Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 6, at 202–26 (reaching the same 
conclusion based on research conducted after 1990). 
 35.  See generally GROSS & MAURO, supra note 5 (discussing sentencing and charging 
decisions in North Carolina); NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 5 (identifying elements that 
factor into the administration of the death penalty in North Carolina). 
 36.  See NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 5, at 93. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 146–48. 
 39.  See generally GROSS & MAURO, supra note 5 (discussing sentencing and charging 
decisions in North Carolina). 
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Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”) Supplemental Homicide Reports to 
analyze the risk of receiving a death sentence among all homicides 
from January 1976 through December 1980, finding that defendants 
in cases with at least one white victim were more likely than those 
with no white victims to receive a death sentence.40 This disparity 
became smaller in controlled analyses and was not statistically 
significant.41 
Two additional published studies examined the influence of race 
on capital punishment primarily in the 1980s and 1990s.42 In the first, 
Isaac Unah examined the influence of race on first-degree and 
second-degree murder convictions between January 1, 1993 and 
December 31, 1997.43 The study included all first-degree murder cases 
that resulted in a death sentence (n = 99) or life without the 
possibility of parole (n = 303), and a random sample of the remaining 
cases stratified to include cases from 26 of the state’s 44 judicial 
districts (n = 118).44 He collected data from court files, appellate 
records, and elsewhere to develop a rich procedural and factual 
understanding of each case.45 Unah also introduced controls for 
contextual factors including county political ideology, party affiliation 
of the district attorney, racial demographics, income, and crime 
rates.46 
The study reported race of victim disparities, but no race of 
defendant disparities. The death-sentencing rate for cases with at 
least one white victim was 3.4%, more than double the 1.6% rate for 
all other cases (p < .01).47 Unadjusted analysis also revealed that 
nonwhite defendants who killed white victims faced the highest 
death-sentencing rate (5.1%), a rate significantly higher than that 
faced by white defendants who killed white victims (3.5%).48 
 
 40.  GROSS & MAURO, supra note 5, at 35, 89 & tbl.5.1 (finding the disparity to be 
13.6% of white victim cases versus 4.3% of black victim cases). 
 41.  Id. at 90 tbl.5.2. 
 42.  See generally Amy R. Stauffer et al., The Interaction Between Victim Race and 
Gender on Sentencing Outcomes in Capital Murder Trials: A Further Exploration, 10 
HOMICIDE STUD. 98 (2006) (examining 153 North Carolina death penalty cases); Isaac 
Unah, Empirical Analysis of Race and the Process of Capital Punishment in North 
Carolina, 2011 MICH.	ST. L. REV. 609 (2011) (analyzing the influence of race on first-
degree and second-degree murder convictions) [hereinafter Unah, Empirical Analysis]. 
 43.  See Unah, Empirical Analysis, supra note 42, at 614, 634–35, 634 nn.127–30, 635 
n.130 (describing study design and sample selection). 
 44.  Id. at 634, 658 app.B. 
 45.  Id. at 655 app.A (explaining data sources). 
 46.  See id. 
 47.  Id. at 636 fig.2, 637 (examining the influence of race on capital punishment 
between January 1, 1993 through December 31, 1997). 
 48.  Id. 
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Based on a controlled stagewise analysis using Heckman probit 
estimates,49 Unah concluded that the nonwhite defendant/white 
victim disparities did not arise from prosecutorial charging decisions, 
concluding that “prosecutors are ten percent less likely to seek the 
death penalty when a nonwhite individual kills a white individual than 
when a white kills a white.”50 Rather, Unah concluded that the 
nonwhite defendant/white victim disparities emerge in jury sentencing 
decisions. Parallel analyses of jury decisions reported that juries are 
8% more likely to impose a death sentence in nonwhite 
defendant/white victim cases than in white defendant/white victim 
cases.51 
In the second study, Amy Stauffer and colleagues analyzed 
penalty trial decisions in 953 North Carolina death penalty cases 
between 1979 and 2002 and used the data to publish several papers.52 
The sample included the universe of penalty trials in the study period. 
Researchers collected case information from public records, including 
trial and appellate court files.53 In addition to demographic 
information on the defendant and victim, the study controlled for use 
of a gun, multiple victims, rural/urban areas, public defender, 
defendants’ prior criminal history, contemporaneous rape or other 
felony charges, victim involvement in illegal activity, and whether the 
penalty hearing was a retrial.54 
The first paper published from this research reported a modest 
disparity in the unadjusted rate that white victim cases received a 
death sentence (52.7%) relative to black victim cases (46.5%), but 
this disparity was not statistically significant.55 It also reported that 
female victim cases were significantly more likely to receive a death 
sentence (57.5%) than male victim cases (45.4%) (p < .05) and that 
white female victim cases were more likely to receive a death 
sentence than any other race/gender combination (58.8%).56 While 
both gender and race were statistically significant predictors of death 
 
 49.  See id. (explaining the choice to use this statistical method). See generally James J. 
Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as Specification Error, 47 ECONOMETRICA 153 (1979) 
(explaining the use of Heckman probit estimates). 
 50.  Unah, Empirical Analysis, supra note 42, at 639. 
 51.  See id. at 649. 
 52.  Stauffer et al., supra note 42, at 102–03. The scholars started with a universe of 
1,074 but eliminated (i) 88 cases because the victim was not black or white and (ii) 31 cases 
because they did not have complete information for coding. For the latter, most of the 
cases were excluded because they lacked a penalty verdict form. Id. 
 53.  Id. at 102. 
 54.  Id. at 104–06. 
 55.  Id. at 108 & tbl.2. 
 56.  Id. 
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sentencing when introduced separately into a logistic regression 
model controlling for other variables of interest,57 the findings 
dropped out of significance when the researchers introduced 
interaction terms for race and gender.58 Subsequent papers reported 
no effect for victim race or gender after analyzing the data using 
propensity score matching rather than logistic regression.59 
Finally, scholars published two additional papers toward the end 
of the first decade of this century.60 In the first, Unah completed a 
second study in 2009 that analyzed the prosecutorial decision to seek 
a death sentence in 151 death-eligible murder cases in Durham 
County, North Carolina, between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 
2007.61 This study reported that prosecutors sought death at a lower 
rate in black victim cases (10.8%, 12/111) than in white victim cases 
(23.5%, 8/34) (p < .06).62 It also found that prosecutors sought death 
in 33% of black defendant/white victim cases (7/21), a rate almost 
four times the rate for all other cases (9.1%, 11/121) (p   .01).63 In 
logistic regression analysis, controlling for seven non-racial culpability 
factors, the study found that prosecutors were 43% more likely to 
seek the death penalty when the case involved a black defendant and 
a white victim than when the case involved a black defendant and a 
black victim.64 
In the second study, Michael Radelet and Glenn Pierce analyzed 
the FBI’s Supplemental Homicide Reports and a supplemental death 
row dataset to examine the influence of race on the outcomes in 
14,749 North Carolina homicides, 368 of which resulted in a death 
 
 57.  Id. at 109 & tbl.3. 
 58.  Id. at 109–10, 110 tbl.4, 111 tbl.5. 
 59.  See, e.g., Wesley G. Jennings et al., A Critical Examination of the “White Victim 
Effect” and Death Penalty Decision-Making from a Propensity Score Matching Approach: 
The North Carolina Experience, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 384, 384 (2014) [hereinafter Jennings et 
al., A Critical Examination]; Wesley G. Jennings et al., A Propensity Score Matching 
Analysis of the Relationship Between Victim Sex and Capital Juror Decision-Making in 
North Carolina, 52 SOC. SCI. RES. 47, 55 (2015). 
 60.  See Radelet & Pierce, supra note 5, at 2119. See generally Isaac Unah, Choosing 
Those Who Will Die: The Effect of Race, Gender, and Law in Prosecutorial Decision to 
Seek the Death Penalty in Durham County, North Carolina, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 135 
(2009) [hereinafter Unah, Choosing Those Who Will Die] (analyzing prosecutorial 
decision-making regarding death sentences). 
 61.  Unah, Choosing Those Who Will Die, supra note 60, at 164. 
 62.  Id. at 165–66, 166 tbl.2. 
 63.  See id. at 167 & tbl.3. 
 64.  See id. at 171 tbl.5, 172–73. 
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sentence.65 This study documents a 3.9% death-sentencing rate for 
cases with at least one white victim compared to a 1.2% rate for black 
victim cases.66 This large disparity, a ratio of 3.25, was statistically 
significant (p < .001).67 They also documented an unadjusted disparity 
within white victim cases, finding that black defendant/white victim 
cases faced a 6.1% death-sentencing rate, compared to a 2.9% death-
sentencing rate for white defendant/white victim cases (p < .001).68 
Radelet and Pierce controlled for the presence of additional 
felony circumstances and additional victims and found that both 
variables were strong and significant predictors of death sentencing.69 
In a logistic regression analysis controlling for these variables, a case 
with at least one white victim still faced an odds ratio of 2.96 
compared to all other cases.70 The odds ratio did not vary by time 
period (1980–1989 and 1990–2007) or based on the number of 
additional factors present in the case.71 
Each previous study in North Carolina has been limited by the 
data available to the researchers. For instance, previous studies have 
had access to only limited controls regarding offender culpability and 
the circumstances of the crime.72 Further, many examine only the 
ultimate outcome of a case rather than the charging and sentencing 
decisions separately.73 Finally, the Unah study, with the most 
complete procedural information and the broadest controls, did not 
have a statewide sample.74 
III.  STUDY DESIGN 
Our methodology follows that of the data-intensive study 
conducted by David Baldus and colleagues in Georgia and litigated in 
McCleskey v. Kemp.75 This methodology has since been refined in 
 
 65.  Radelet & Pierce, supra note 5, at 2138–40. The original sample included 15,281 
homicide suspects. The study disregarded individuals suspected in a homicide in which the 
victim was not white or black, leading to a sample of 14,749. Id. at 2138. 
 66.  Id. at 2140. 
 67.  Id. at 2140, 2151 tbl.A-3(a). 
 68.  Id. at 2152 tbl.A-3(c). 
 69.  Id. at 2141, 2152 tbl.A-4. 
 70.  Id. at 2145, 2159 tbl.A-10(c). 
 71.  Id. at 2145, 2159 tbl.A-11(b), 2160 tbl.A-12(b). 
 72.  Both Unah and Stauffer applied a wide range of culpability controls. See supra 
notes 46, 54 and accompanying text. 
 73.  But c.f., Unah, Empirical Analysis, supra note 42, at 613 (examining charging and 
sentencing decisions as well as outcomes). 
 74.  See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 75.  See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286–91 (1987). For a thorough discussion 
of the studies underlying the McCleskey litigation, see DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE 
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numerous jurisdictions.76 The characteristics of McCleskey-style 
studies are the following: 
1. A sample of cases from a specific jurisdiction that is limited 
to death-eligible murders; 
2. Comprehensive and detailed information on both statutory 
and non-statutory aggravating and mitigating non-racial 
case characteristics that, under the law of the jurisdiction, 
bear on the defendant’s culpability; 
3. Detail on decision-making in each case start-to-finish to 
facilitate describing and then statistically modeling the flow 
of cases through the system; 
4. The inclusion of all penalty trial cases, including all death-
sentenced cases; 
5. Variables for the race and socioeconomic status (SES) of all 
defendants and victims; 
6. To the extent possible, reliance on primary sources such as 
case files and court records; and 
7. Mixed methods (qualitative, in the form case studies or 
narratives, and quantitative, in the form of aggregate or 
structural analyses) for documenting systemic race and 
geographic disparities.77 
This study examines decision-making in death-eligible murder 
cases from North Carolina from 1990 through 2009. We selected cases 
using a three-level sampling scheme that included the universe of 
penalty trial cases. Level 1 contains all cases in which a defendant 
received a death sentence. Level 2 contains all death-eligible murder 
cases in which the prosecution sought a death sentence at a penalty 
trial but the defendant received life. Level 3 contains a stratified 
 
WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 1–3 (1990). 
 76.  See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the 
Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska 
Experience (1973–1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486, 492–97 (2002) [hereinafter Baldus et al., 
Analysis of the Nebraska Experience]; David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and 
the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent 
Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998) [hereinafter Baldus et al., 
Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era]; Katherine Barnes, David Sloss & Stephen 
Thaman, Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Decision-Making in 
Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 305, 305–08 (2009); Raymond Paternoster et al., 
Justice by Geography and Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 
1978–1999, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER, & CLASS 1, 2, 15–24 (2004). 
 77.  David C. Baldus et al., Empirical Studies of Race and Geographic Discrimination 
in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Primer on the Key Methodological Issues, in 
THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 153, 155 (Charles S. Lanier, William J. 
Bowers & James R. Acker eds., 2009). 
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random sample of death-eligible cases in which the prosecution could 
have but did not seek a death sentence. 
Using these criteria, the study collected detailed information on 
1,514 cases: (1) 314 cases in which a defendant received a death 
sentence; (2) 378 death-eligible murder cases in which the prosecution 
sought a death sentence at a penalty trial but the defendant received 
life; and (3) a random sample of 822 death-eligible murder cases in 
which the prosecution did not seek a death sentence.78 
A. Identifying Cases for Inclusion in the Study 
The North Carolina Department of Corrections (“DOC”) 
website keeps information on every person sentenced to death in 
North Carolina since 1977.79 We used this information to identify the 
Level 1 cases.80 To identify Level 2 cases, we started with earlier 
research supplemented with information from the DOC website, 
Westlaw, and a list of homicide cases from the North Carolina 
Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”).81 We refer to the Level 
1 and 2 cases combined as the “penalty trial cases.” 
While it was possible to identify all penalty trial cases based on 
relatively accessible information, drawing an appropriate sample for 
Level 3 presented a greater challenge. As mentioned above, AOC 
provided a list of all defendants prosecuted for homicide in North 
Carolina during the study period. After substantial cleaning and 
removal of penalty trial cases, this list contained more than 13,400 
cases.82 As it was not possible to identify in advance which of these 
 
 78.  See infra Table 1 for more details on the study sample. 
 79.  See Death Row Roster, NC PUBLIC SAFETY, http://www.ncdps.gov/Adult-
Corrections/Prisons/Death-Penalty/Death-Row-Roster [https://perma.cc/UUL7-3Z8E]; see 
also Removed from Death Row, NC PUBLIC SAFETY, http://www.ncdps.gov/Adult-
Corrections/Prisons/Death-Penalty/People-removed-from-death-row [https://perma.cc/86LX
-C7AD]. 
 80.  Professor Beth Bjerregaard and Professor Dwayne Smith kindly gave us a list of 
the capital penalty trial cases underlying their publication on decision-making in North 
Carolina capital penalty trials. See generally Stauffer et al., supra note 42 (describing the 
study). 
 81.  To ensure that the list was complete, we compared it to lists of penalty trial cases 
kept by the North Carolina Office of Indigent Defense and the Center for Death Penalty 
Litigation in Durham, North Carolina. We also asked attorneys with lengthy capital 
practice experience to review it for completeness. 
 82.  The original file provided by AOC contained approximately 33,000 lines of data 
relating to homicides. Each line reported on a case. The file contained extensive 
duplication. We deduplicated this file using multiple matches, including first and last 
names, trial dates, birth dates, and service dates. Subsequent analysis suggested that we 
improperly removed some cases from this list during deduplication. We reviewed the list 
from the beginning, repeated the deduplication protocols, and analyzed the impact of the 
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cases were death eligible, we sought to define a stratified random 
sample that would provide any viable RJA claim the strongest 
support available. 
The language of the RJA suggested that both time and 
geography were important.83 We therefore identified three relevant 
time periods for stratification by considering key changes in North 
Carolina death penalty law.84 We also stratified the cases 
geographically by North Carolina Superior Court prosecutorial 
district.85 To determine the number of cases required in each stratum, 
we sorted penalty trial cases into districts and time periods, as defined 
above. The target number of Level 3 cases for each stratum mirrored 
the number of penalty trial cases in that stratum.86 
The next step was to identify death-eligible homicide cases from 
the AOC list. We divided the cases by district and time period using 
trial dates provided by AOC, thereby developing 118 separate lists.87 
Cases were sorted randomly, and staff attorneys reviewed cases in the 
order presented on the randomized lists until they identified the 
target number of death-eligible cases needed for that stratum.88 The 
 
improperly removed cases on our sample. The improperly removed cases were distributed 
randomly throughout the study with respect to time and geographic area. 
 83.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-2011(a) (2009) (repealed 2013) (providing that a 
defendant must show discrimination “at the time the death sentence was sought or 
imposed” and “in the county, the prosecutorial district, the judicial division, or the State”). 
 84.  The first period ran from January 1, 1990 until December 31, 1994. The end of 
this period roughly coincides with the advent of the sentence of life without parole in 
North Carolina. See Act of Mar. 23, 1994, ch. 21, sec. 1, 1994 N.C. Sess. Laws 59, 59–61 
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	14-17 (2015)). More precisely, it evenly divides 
the period between January 1990 and a change in law on July 1, 2001, allowing prosecutors 
to exercise discretion in whether to charge death-eligible murder capitally. See Act of May 
17, 2001, ch. 81, sec. 3–4, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 163, 164–65 (codified as amended at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §	15A-2004 (2015) (authorizing prosecutorial discretion and making the 
revisions effective July 1, 2001)). The second time period spans January 1, 1995, until 
December 31, 2000. The third period spans January 1, 2001, until December 31, 2009. 
 85.  See North Carolina Superior Court Prosecutorial Districts: Effective January 15, 
2009, N.C. CT. SYS., https://web.archive.org/web/20140514063241/http://www.nccourts.org
/Courts/Trial/District/Documents/DistrictCourtmap.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS6W-ZVR3]. 
 86.  For example, if there were 12 penalty trial cases in a district and the 12 penalty 
trial cases were evenly divided between the three time periods (i.e., 4 cases in each 
period), the Level 3 sample from that district would ideally include 4 cases from each of 
the three time periods for a total of 12 cases. 
 87.  Where the AOC did not provide a trial date, but did provide a date labeled 
“filing date,” we used the filing date for assignment. Where the AOC did not provide a 
trial date or a filing date, we used the year in the case number assigned by the courts for 
tracking the file. 
 88.  Because of the need to conduct additional reviews for death eligibility, we 
instructed screeners to review cases until they identified two cases more than were 
required for the stratum. This review processes followed the methodology used by David 
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process allowed us to populate the stratified sample of death-eligible 
murder cases randomly without knowing in advance the death 
eligibility of the cases on the AOC list. 
B. Populating the Level 3 Random Sample 
Staff attorneys screened cases to populate the Level 3 sample89 
by completing a Death Eligibility Screening Instrument (“DCI”) for 
each case reviewed.90 This instrument guided them through a series of 
questions facilitating an initial judgment on (1)	the sufficiency of the 
information available to assess the death eligibility of a case and 
(2)	when possible, its death eligibility.91 Attorneys deemed cases 
death eligible if the defendant was accused of first-degree murder 
under North Carolina law92 and at least one statutory aggravating 
factor was present in the case.93 
Each case initially deemed death eligible underwent a 
standardized review of the death eligibility finding.94 When the 
question of death eligibility was close, a retired North Carolina 
Superior Court judge reviewed the case according to a written Death 
Eligibility Review Protocol, using the two-page Final Death 
 
Baldus and colleagues. See Baldus et al., Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era, supra note 
76, at 1669–70. 
 89.  In several strata, the Level 3 sample slightly exceeds the target sample. In a few 
strata, we reviewed all candidate cases but did not identify the targeted number of death-
eligible cases, usually due to information insufficiency. When this happened, staff 
attorneys coded additional cases from a different time period in the same district. 
 90.  CATHERINE GROSSO & BARBARA O’BRIEN, N.C. RACIAL JUSTICE ACT 
CHARGING AND SENTENCING STUDY, DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT (Mar. 13, 
2010) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 91.  The research team created an electronic case file for each candidate case from 
court records, medical examiner records, media reports, and other sources. For most Level 
3 cases, the case file also included an Official Crime Version report (“OCV report”) 
provided by the North Carolina DOC under a protective order prohibiting copying or 
recording and requiring prompt return of the source data. These reports provided 
essential factual information about the underlying crimes based on multiple sources such 
as police reports and witness interviews. 
 92.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	14-17 (2015). 
 93.  Id. §	15A-2000(e). Data collected in the course of screening for death eligibility 
provided important information about the rate of death eligibility among homicides in 
North Carolina during the study period. This information allowed us to estimate the 
universe and to develop weights necessary for analysis using the Level 3 sample. After 
completing the death eligibility review, the staff attorney entered a code in a screening 
column in the randomly sorted stratum case list. The code indicated whether the case was 
potentially death eligible, not death eligible, outside the study period (pre-1990), or 
lacking in sufficient information to determine death eligibility. These codes were then 
used to calculate the sampling fractions and the weights for analysis as described below. 
 94.  All defendant and victim race information was removed from cases during the 
review process. 
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Eligibility Screening Instrument and a one- or two-page narrative 
summary.95 
At the end of this process, we had identified 1,514 cases in three 
strata for inclusion in the analysis. Level 1 included 314 cases 
resulting in a death sentence. Level 2 included 378 cases resulting in a 
life sentence or life without parole at a penalty trial. Level 3 included 
822 death-eligible homicide cases that did not advance to a penalty 
trial. While Levels 1 and 2 include the universe of cases, Level 3 is a 
stratified sample that mirrors the number, geographical distribution, 
and date distribution of penalty trial cases in Levels 1 and 2. 
IV.  DATABASE DEVELOPMENT: COLLECT, CODE, ENTER, AND 
REVIEW 
Staff attorneys and volunteers collected source material for each 
case in this study.96 For every case, our goal was to obtain the most 
complete information available about the defendant, victim, 
circumstances of the crime, and procedural history.97 
 
 95.  Retired Superior Court Judge Melzer A. Morgan, Jr. reviewed the death 
eligibility of every “close case” blind to the race of both the victims and defendants. Judge 
Morgan was to consider whether a North Carolina appellate court would sustain a jury 
finding that the aggravator was present or that the case was death eligible. The Death 
Eligibility Review Protocol defined a “close case” as any case in which one or more of the 
following aggravators provided the sole basis for death eligibility: (1) The murder was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel under §	15A-2000(e)(9); (2) the murder was 
committed for pecuniary gain under §	15A-2000(e)(6) except those cases involving a 
robbery or larceny; (3) there was a previous conviction for a violent felony under §	15A-
2000(e)(3) where the prior felony is a felony other than homicide, attempted homicide, 
rape, sexual assault, attempted rape, attempted sexual assault, robbery, armed robbery, 
attempted robbery, felonious assault, attempted felonious assault, or felonious discharge 
of a firearm; (4) the murder was part of the defendant’s course of violent conduct toward 
another person or persons under §	15A-2000(e)(11) unless the case involves double 
homicide or a murder with a non-decedent victim at the scene; or (5) the defendant 
created great risk of death to more than one person by a hazardous weapon under §	15A-
2000(e)(10). The protocol also defined as “close” any case where the finding of death 
eligibility contradicted a Rule 24 order finding that there were no aggravating 
circumstances in the case. The trial judge reviews death eligibility in every case as required 
by Rule 24 of the North Carolina General Rules of Practice for Superior and District 
Courts. N.C. SUP. & DIST. CTS. R. 24. Judge Morgan reversed the finding of death 
eligibility in 28 of these cases (18%). In all cases, he exercised final judgment as to whether 
a case was death eligible for purposes of inclusion in the study. 
 96.  Research team members collected data from the University of North Carolina 
School of Law Kathrine R. Everett Law Library, AOC electronic archives, county courts, 
the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, and resources available online. 
 97.  Sources of data included (1) primary records from superior court files; 
(2)	appellate court opinions and records on appeal; (3) OCV Medical Examiner; 
(4)	information on the DOC website; (5) media reports; (6) criminal background 
information on LexisNexis; (7) archived issues of the Capital Update published by the 
Center for Death Penalty Litigation; and (8) occasionally, conversations with attorneys 
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The bridge between the case files and our database is the DCI-a 
29-page questionnaire that staff attorneys completed for each case.98 
Development of the DCI began with a systematic review of (1) the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina comparative proportionality review 
jurisprudence99 and (2) previous capital charging and sentencing 
studies in North Carolina and other jurisdictions.100 We tailored the 
DCI to include information on the factors identified in this review 
and to capture complete procedural information as well as details 
about the defendant, the victim, and the circumstances of the crime. 
The DCI documents the statutory basis for the cases and includes 
questions relating to strength of evidence, defenses, and possible 
motives.101 In addition to completing the 29-page DCI, staff attorneys 
drafted a short narrative description of the case that included its 
procedural history and all facts bearing on homicidal liability and the 
presence of aggravating factors. 
We undertook several measures to enhance the accuracy and 
consistency of coding decisions.102 Staff attorneys coded all cases 
 
involved in the case. With the exception of the OCV reports, these data are available from 
the author upon request. For conclusions drawn from this data, see infra Part V. 
 98.  GROSSO & O’BRIEN, N.C. RACIAL JUSTICE ACT CHARGING AND SENTENCING 
STUDY, supra note 90. 
 99.  A staff attorney reviewed 482 Supreme Court of North Carolina opinions 
between 1979 and 2009 to develop a list of factors that the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina relied on in making decisions about whether a death sentence was 
disproportionate under state law. See N.C. RACIAL JUSTICE ACT STUDY PROJECT, 
CODING PROTOCOL 2–5 (Feb. 12, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); 
Factors Supporting Findings of Proportionality or Disproportionality (2009) (on file 
with the North Carolina Law Review); North Carolina Reported Decisions Under G.S. 
15A-2000 (2009) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).  
 100.  We reviewed the data collection instruments used in studies of various geographic 
locations and subsets of the military. See Baldus et al., Analysis of the Nebraska 
Experience, supra note 76, at 532–40 (Nebraska); Baldus et al., Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era, supra note 76, at 1667–75 (Philadelphia); David C. Baldus et al. Racial 
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Experience of the United 
States Armed Forces (1984–2005), 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1227, 1249–61 (2011) 
[hereinafter Baldus et al., United States Armed Forces] (United States Armed Forces); 
Unah, Empirical Analysis, supra note 42, at 634–35, 634 nn.127–30 (North Carolina). 
 101.  See generally O’BRIEN & GROSSO, N.C. RACIAL JUSTICE ACT CHARGING AND 
SENTENCING STUDY, supra note 90 (surveying cases through a 29-page questionnaire). 
 102.  Coding decisions form a process of using information, possibly from several 
sources, to assign a finding to one of a set of predefined categories. For example, 
“defendant knew the victim” could be a category. We designed a series of review exercises 
to test the reliability and accuracy of the coding. A second team of staff attorneys entered 
information from the DCI into the database at Michigan State University College of Law. 
They reviewed coding against the narrative summaries and identified inconsistencies and 
possible errors. In one such review, an experienced staff attorney reviewed all cases coded 
in the first several weeks of the coding process and all cases coded by each new staff 
attorney in her or his first two weeks of coding. A second similar staff attorney reviewed 
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under the supervision of experienced attorneys.103 They received 
detailed instruction on the substantive and procedural stages of a 
capital prosecution in North Carolina, relevant death penalty law, and 
a written study-coding protocol. Once coding of a DCI was 
completed, an experienced attorney reviewed it,104 sometimes 
resulting in corrections or requests for reconsideration.105 
The coding protocol articulated evidentiary standards for 
different sections of the DCI and stated procedures for identifying 
and addressing missing information.106 For example, the protocol 
provided that, for questions largely unrelated to the defendant’s 
culpability (such as those dealing with procedure), the evidentiary 
standard is whether the reported facts reasonably support one or 
more of the available coding options.107 In contrast, for questions 
bearing most centrally on culpability, the DCI often asks whether the 
fact at issue is “expressly stated or strongly suggested in the file.”108 In 
 
hundreds of cases to verify that the number of aggravators recorded in the case accurately 
followed decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina with respect to double 
counting of evidence. 
 103.  Most of the staff attorneys had finished law school within one or two years of this 
project. In addition, more than fifteen volunteers worked on this project, primarily in data 
collection. Volunteers included law students, one undergraduate student, and others. No 
volunteers screened or coded cases. 
  University of North Carolina School of Law Professor Richard Rosen, attorney 
Adam Stein, and Project Manager and Lead Staff Attorney Jennifer Marsh supervised a 
total of 37 staff attorneys. Professor Rosen bore primary responsibility for resolving any 
legal issues that arose while coding the DCI with respect to North Carolina capital 
punishment law, relying on guidance provided by Professor Robert L. Farb in his North 
Carolina Capital Case Law Handbook. See generally ROBERT L. FARB, NORTH 
CAROLINA CAPITAL CASE LAW HANDBOOK (2d ed. 2004) (explaining case law affecting 
trial and sentencing regarding first-degree murder charges). Professor Rosen recorded 
these legal issues and their resolutions in a log available for coders to consult, a copy of 
which is available from the authors upon request. 
 104.  When experienced staff attorneys conducted the reviews, they presented any 
legal issues that arose to Professor Rosen or Mr. Stein. 
 105.  For instance, staff attorneys continued to assess the death eligibility of each case 
assigned for coding. Some cases were found not to be death eligible once coding began. 
Upon further review, we excluded cases that did not result in a homicide conviction. While 
these cases appeared factually death eligible, a prosecutor’s decision to forgo homicide 
charges raised enough concerns about the accuracy of our information or the strength of 
the evidence to support a decision to exclude these cases from the random sample. 
 106.  See O’BRIEN & GROSSO, N.C. RACIAL JUSTICE ACT CHARGING AND 
SENTENCING STUDY, supra note 90. 
 107.  O’BRIEN & GROSSO, N.C. RACIAL JUSTICE ACT CHARGING AND 
SENTENCING STUDY, supra note 90, at 9. 
 108.  A fact is “expressly stated” in the file, when, for example, the defendant’s prior 
mental illness is stated in an expert report or uncontradicted testimony to which the court 
or defense counsel refer. Determining whether a factor is “strongly suggested” by the file 
often calls for an inferential judgment. For example, if throughout an entire file, which 
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applying this standard, staff attorneys were to consider whether an 
appellate court presented with a finding of fact adverse to the 
defendant would determine upon review of the “whole record” that 
“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”109 When considering facts 
relating to aggravation or mitigation, the protocol instructed staff 
attorneys to weigh information “as a reasonable juror would be 
expected to do.”110 
Additional rules addressed information insufficiency and 
conflicting evidence. When an underlying fact related to the basis of 
liability, conflicts in evidence were resolved in a way that supported 
the fact finder’s determination.111 Similarly, when evidence about a 
fact bearing on aggravation or mitigation was ambiguous or 
conflicting, the person analyzing the data was to code it in the way 
that “support[s] the legitimacy of the sentence.”112 
Staff attorneys were also prohibited from making independent 
coding decisions that would be inconsistent with certain factual 
determinations known as a “controlling finding of fact.”113 This rule 
ensured that coders did not override official fact-finding with their 
own judgment. Controlling findings of fact are made only by fact 
finders; namely, juries in the instance of jury trials; judges during 
 
appears to be reasonably complete, there is no mention of the defendant’s previous 
murder charge, it is reasonable to conclude that the accused had no such charge. 
 109.  See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 
 110.  However, the protocol expressly prohibits a coder from crediting a defendant’s 
exculpatory statement unless there was independent corroborating evidence in the file. An 
inculpatory statement may be given ordinary weight. N.C. RACIAL JUSTICE ACT STUDY 
PROJECT, supra note 99, at 10.  
 111.  To illustrate this point, the coding protocol instructs staff attorneys that “in a first 
degree murder conviction case, the coder can assume that the fact finder credited the 
government’s witnesses, drew all rational inferences from the witnesses’ testimony 
against the accused, discounted the defendant’s testimony, and refused to accept any 
disputable inference in his or her favor.” Id. at 12. The next sentence in the protocol 
contrasts the following situation: 
On the other hand, if it is plain that the accused intentionally killed the victim with 
premeditation, the fact of a plea bargain resulting in a second degree murder 
conviction should not change coding that the killing was factually intentional and 
premeditated if the evidence is legally sufficient to support a first degree murder 
conviction. 
Id. 
 112.  Id. at 13. The protocol continues, “Hence in resolving such ambiguities and 
conflicts, it is important whether the case resulted in a death sentence or less. In death 
cases, ambiguities and conflicts should be resolved in an aggravating direction, whereas in 
all other cases, ambiguities and conflicts should be resolved in a mitigating direction.” Id. 
at 13. 
 113.  N.C. RACIAL JUSTICE ACT STUDY PROJECT, supra note 99, at 5–7. 
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bench trials; or judges in cases of an accepted guilty plea for first-
degree murder.114 In addition, an appellate court ruling that the 
evidence is not sufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of 
first-degree murder or of an aggravator is a controlling fact.115 
This process of reviewing and coding data created a database 
with machine-readable information about each case in the study. The 
next section of the paper explains how we analyzed this data and 
presents our findings. 
V.  DATA ANALYSIS 
We analyzed the data overall and in stages in an effort to 
determine whether race was a significant factor in the decision to seek 
or impose the death penalty between 1990 and 2009 in North 
Carolina. This project does not set out to prove causation. Rather, it 
seeks to identify what facts about a defendant in a death-eligible 
murder case made the person more likely to be charged as a capital 
offender and to be sentenced to death and whether race-race of the 
defendant or race of the victim, or the combined race of defendant 
and victim-persisted as an important fact notwithstanding other 
important characteristics.116 The question is not whether race 
consciously motivated decision-makers, but whether it was associated 
with a significant increase or decrease in an adverse outcome for 
which no other factor(s) could account. 
Before analyzing the data collected and coded as described 
above, it was necessary to calculate the appropriate weights. Because 
the study includes the universe of penalty trial cases, all cases in 
Levels	1 and 2 have a weight of “1”. As noted above, staff attorneys 
reviewed Level 3 cases for death eligibility using randomized lists of 
cases that had been divided into individual strata.117 For each case 
reviewed, the staff attorney noted whether the case was death 
eligible, not death eligible, or whether the case file lacked sufficient 
 
 114.  Prosecutors are never fact finders, and thus, their charging and plea-bargaining 
decisions are never controlling. 
 115.  Excluding the subset of defendants found not guilty at trial is a deliberately 
conservative approach. There is a risk that this approach could introduce some bias in our 
estimates if the prosecutors’ decisions were particularly aggressive in these cases. 
 116.  Alternately stated, we consider when, as a group, cases containing a certain 
attribute exhibit a particular adverse outcome at a significantly higher (or lower) rate than 
cases in which it is absent. 
 117.  The term “stratum” refers to a single district and time period. There are three 
strata in each district, one for each time period. 
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information to make a determination.118 We used this information to 
calculate the sampling fraction for each stratum.119 
Table 1 provides an overview of the study sample by design level 
(Levels 1, 2, and 3), race of defendant and victim, time period, and in 
total cases. As noted above, the study analyzes 1,514 cases: all 314 
cases in which a defendant received a death sentence, all 378 death-
eligible murder cases in which the prosecution sought a death 
sentence at a penalty trial but the defendant received life, and a 
random sample of 822 death-eligible murder cases in which the 
prosecution did not seek a death sentence at a penalty trial. The 
descriptive statistics show that the defendants in the study are 
overwhelmingly male (94%). Almost 60% of the total defendants are 
black (Column E, Row 5), but only 50% of the defendants sentenced 
to death are black (Column B, Row 5). The next largest group 
comprises white defendants and then Native American defendants.120 
The number of cases in the database decreases over time, as expected 





 118.  O’BRIEN & GROSSO, N.C. RACIAL JUSTICE ACT CHARGING AND 
SENTENCING STUDY, supra note 90, at 9–13. 
 119.  A sampling fraction is the sample size expressed as a fraction of the population of 
the stratum. Weight is the reciprocal of the sampling fraction, so if one-third of the cases in 
a stratum are in our sample, then each sampled case has weight 3 since it “represents” 
three cases in the population. In this study, the sampling fractions and corresponding 
weights are estimated because we do not know the numbers of death-eligible cases in 
Level 3 strata. Weight uncertainty is taken into account via multiple imputations in our 
final, confirmatory analyses of each model. 
 120.  Others have observed an emerging Hispanic population in the South generally, 
and in North Carolina, in particular. See Marla R. Emery, Clare Ginger & Jim 
Chamberlain, Migrants, Markets, and the Transformation of Natural Resources 
Management: Galax Harvesting in Western North Carolina, in LATINOS IN THE NEW 
SOUTH: TRANSFORMATIONS OF PLACE 69, 70 (Heather A. Smith & Owen J. Furuseth 
eds., 2006) (“Restructuring of the U.S. labor market has led to especially strong growth in 
the Latino population of North Carolina, which experienced a 45% net immigration rate 
between 1995 and 2000.”); Heather A. Smith & Owen J. Furuseth, Making Real the 
Mythical Latino Community in Charlotte, North Carolina, in LATINOS IN THE NEW 
SOUTH: TRANSFORMATIONS OF PLACE 191, 191–93 (Heather A. Smith & Owen J. 
Furuseth eds., 2006) (reporting on and reviewing studies documenting growth of Latino 
population in North Carolina). See generally LATINOS IN THE NEW SOUTH: 
TRANSFORMATIONS OF PLACE (Heather A. Smith & Owen J. Furuseth eds., 2006) 
(exploring trends associated with the increase of Latinos in the United States). This trend 
is not reflected in the homicide cases in our study. 
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Table 1: North Carolina Charging and Sentencing Study, 1990–2009: 
Descriptive Statistics* 
 A B C D E 
  Level 1: Penalty 
Trial, Death 
Level 2: Penalty 
Trial, Life 
Level 3: No 
Capital Trial 
Total Cases 
  n % n % n % n % 
1. Full database 314 21% 378 25% 822 54% 1,514 100 
2. Male 305 97% 361 95% 763 93% 1,429 94% 
3. Female 9 3% 17 4% 59 7% 85 6% 
4. White 138 44% 137 36% 255 31% 530 35% 
5. Black 158 50% 217 57% 520 63% 895 59% 
6. Hispanic 5 2% 3 1% 28 3% 36 2% 
7. Native 
American 12 4% 19 5% 17 2% 48 3% 
8. Other 1 <1% 2 <1% 2 <1% 5 <1% 
9. White victim 212 67% 214 57% 355 43% 781 52% 
















5 2% 16 4% 22 3% 43 3% 
15. 1990–1994 118 38% 133 35% 227 28% 478 32% 
16. 1995–1999 128 41% 143 38% 265 32% 536 35% 
17. 2000–2004 49 16% 72 19% 215 26% 336 22% 
18. 2005–2009 19 6% 30 8% 115 14% 164 11% 
 
Table 1 is an unweighted breakdown of the cases in the sample 
rather than weighted estimates of the population breakdown. Level 3 
cases are weighted in subsequent analyses in this paper. In addition, 
the subsequent analyses exclude any case not involving black or white 
defendants and victims.121 
In the analyses below, we present unadjusted disparities, tables 
controlling only for the number of statutory aggravating 
circumstances, and finally, logistic regression used to control for 
 
 *  This paper follows a conservative rounding rule.	The fraction must be .6 or greater 
to round up.	Otherwise, the calculation is rounded down. 
 121.  This follows standard practices where the representation rates of other race or 
ethnic groups are too small for meaningful quantitative analysis. See, e.g., Stauffer et al., 
supra note 42, at 103. 
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significant non-racial factors. The coding process described above 
provided more than 200 possible control variables for each outcome 
variable analyzed in the study. In the logistic regression, we sought to 
identify statutory and other legitimate, non-racial control variables 
that most consistently and reliably predict whether a case will 
advance to the more punitive outcome. The resulting statistical 
models implicitly match cases by a race-neutral measure of 
culpability, statistically inferred from the decision-makers’ acts, and 
then estimate the impact of racial factors controlling for level of 
culpability in a manner analogous to Table 3. 
In each case, we started our analysis for each outcome variable 
(“Death1, CapTrial, and PTDeath”) with a simple model using only 
the statistically and theoretically important statutory aggravating and 
mitigating factors as controls.122 This model also regularly included 
one race of defendant variable (“DefB”) and one race of victim 
variable (“WhiteVic”) so as to isolate race effects from the control 
variables.123 Working from this core model, we used two different 
logistic regression procedures, or PROCs, in SAS124 (proc logistic and 
logistic) to analyze the importance of each possible control variable 
individually and in small groups.125 This process allowed us to identify 
the most important control variables for each outcome variable, 
which ranged from 50 to 70 key variables. 
We then worked with these key variables to specify three models 
for each outcome variable. The first model analyzed, as candidate 
variables for inclusion, those controls that bore directly on the 
culpability of the defendant or the circumstances of the crime. The 
culpability-only model appears in Column B in each regression table. 
The second model evaluated the importance of personal 
variables to the outcome variable at issue. Personal variables coded 
aspects not specifically related to the defendant’s culpability or the 
nature of the crime, such as the gender of the victim, the relationship 
 
 122.  Death1 codes the fact of receiving a death sentence. CapTrial codes a 
prosecutorial decision to bring the case to trial seeking a death sentence (i.e., to a capital 
trial). PTDeath codes the fact of receiving a death sentence in a penalty trial. PTDeath 
further limits the universe to those cases reaching a penalty trial. See infra Appendix A, 
Variable Definitions. 
 123.  Including the race variables in this model helps to exclude non-racial variables 
that are highly correlated with one or both race variables and are insignificant after 
controlling for race variables. 
 124.  The data analyses for this paper were generated using SAS software. 
 125.  One macro can be manipulated to step variables into the model in order of 
statistical importance. This model typically understates the statistical significance. The 
second macro applies weights more precisely and, therefore, estimates statistical 
significance more accurately. 
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between defendant and victim, or the fact of having an appointed 
attorney. Column C of each regression table reports the model 
including these variables. 
The third model included context variables in the analysis. These 
variables evaluated the potential effects of factors related to broader 
social and political contexts of the cases in the study. Prior research 
has shown that factors such as a locality’s homicide rate,126 prevailing 
political ideology,127 racial demographics,128 and economic health129 
may be associated with the use of the death penalty. We therefore 
analyzed several contextual variables to assess whether they could 
explain the racial disparities we found in charging and sentencing 
decisions. Specifically, we controlled for each county’s murder rate,130 
political conservatism,131 portion of the population that was black,132 
 
 126.  See Theodore Eisenberg, Death Sentence Rates and County Demographics: An 
Empirical Study, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 347, 358 (2005) (finding that the rate of death 
sentencing decreases as a county’s homicide rate increases). But see David Jacobs, Jason 
T. Carmichael & Stephanie L. Kent, Vigilantism, Current Racial Threat, and Death 
Sentences, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 656, 667 (2005) (finding that states with the higher violent 
crime rates were more likely to sentence capital defendants to death). 
 127.  See David Jacobs & Jason T. Carmichael, Ideology, Social Threat, and the Death 
Sentence: Capital Sentences Across Time and Space, 83 SOC. FORCES 249, 267 (2004) 
(finding that states with Republican leadership were more likely to have the death 
penalty); David C. Nice, The States and the Death Penalty, 45 W. POL. Q. 1037, 1044–45 
(1992) (finding higher rates of execution in states with a more politically conservative 
population). 
 128.  See Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 357 tbl.2 (finding that a county’s death sentence 
rate decreases as the county’s black population increases). But see David Jacobs & Jason 
T. Carmichael, The Political Sociology of the Death Penalty: A Pooled Time-Series 
Analysis, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 109, 126 (2002) (finding that states with larger black 
populations were more likely to have the death penalty). 
 129.  See Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 357 tbl.2 (finding that the rate of death 
sentencing decreases as a county’s per capita income increases). 
 130.  See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING STATISTICS, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/ 
[https://perma.cc/AJ5K-FF7E]. The Uniform Crime Report did not include statistics from 
every county for every year. The annual North Carolina crime report provided the data 
missing. N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, http://crimereporting.ncdoj.gov [https://perma.cc
/5JJR-PMUV]. 
 131.  We calculated political conservatism using the percentage of votes cast for the 
Republican candidate in the presidential election nearest to the time of the case. For the 
underlying data, see N.C. Census Lookup: State Comparisons, LOG INTO NC, http://
data.osbm.state.nc.us/pls/linc/dyn_linc_main.show [https://perma.cc/HPP2-D5MA]. This 
practice is common among like studies. See Noelle E. Fearn, A Multilevel Analysis of 
Community Effects on Criminal Sentencing, 22 JUST. Q. 452, 465 (2005); Jeffrey T. Ulmer 
& Brian Johnson, Sentencing in Context: A Multilevel Analysis, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 137, 151 
(2004). 
 132.  N.C. Census Lookup: State Comparisons, supra note 131 (gathering county 
population by year). 
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and per capita personal income.133 In each instance, we calculated the 
variable based on the location and time of each case. 
The section below proceeds in three parts. The first part presents 
unadjusted and then controlled analysis for the combined risk of 
receiving a death sentence. The second presents the findings with 
respect to the prosecutorial decision to bring a case to a capital trial. 
Finally, the third part reports the analysis of jury decisions at penalty 
trials. 
A. Analysis of Combined Risk of Receiving a Death Sentence 
Death-eligible murder cases in North Carolina during the 1990–
2009 study period resulted in a death sentence in an estimated 6% of 
the cases (285/4,929).134 This rate resembles the rate observed in other 
jurisdictions in the 1990s and later.135 
1. Comparative Selection Rates-Controlling for Race of Victim 
Table 2 presents the statistically unadjusted disparities in the 
treatment of white victim cases. These analyses compare the 
percentage of white victim cases that receive a death sentence to the 
percentage of black victim cases that receive a death sentence. White 
victim cases make up less than one half of the estimated universe 
(45%, 2,254/4,929). Yet, white victim cases are 3.3 times more likely 
(8.6%/3.4%) to receive a death sentence than black victim cases 
(estimated n = 2,675) (p < .0001). This unadjusted disparity suggests 
that race of victim may influence charging and sentencing decisions. 
These analyses, however, do not consider whether the relative 









 133.  Interactive Data, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., http://
www.bea.gov/itable [https://perma.cc/B2YF-DDDY] (containing per capita income by 
country for 1990–2010 from Bureau of Economic Analysis). 
 134.  See infra Table 2. 
 135.  See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death 
Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic 
Disparities?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637, 641 (2014) (5.8%, 12/205); Paternoster et 
al., supra note 76, at 52 fig.1 (5.8%). 
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Table 2: Statewide Unadjusted Rate at Which Cases Result in a Death 
Sentence by Race of Victim 
 A B C D E F 









1. White victim 8.6% 195/2,254 5.2% 2.5 <.0001 
2. Black victim 3.4% 90/2,675    
3. Overall rate 5.8% 285/4,929    
 
The aggravating factors listed in North Carolina’s death penalty 
statutes provide a simple way to measure the relative culpability of 
defendants in different cases.136 Theoretically, the number of 
aggravating factors in a case provides one approximation of its level 
of aggravation.137 Table 3 groups the cases by the number of 
aggravating circumstances. Column A reports the number at each 
level. Column B, Rows 1–5, demonstrates that, as we would expect 
theoretically, the number of aggravators present in a case influences 
the likelihood of a case resulting in a death sentence. Approximately 
2.2% of cases with a single aggravating circumstance result in a death 
sentence, 3.8% with two aggravators, 6.9% with three aggravators, 
9.6% with four aggravators, and 17.4% of cases with five or more 
aggravating circumstances. This suggests, as one would expect, that 
decision-makers in North Carolina view cases with a higher number 
of aggravating circumstances as more culpable and more worthy of a 
death sentence. 
Columns D through F report the data after controlling for race of 
the victim at each level of aggravation. These controls allow for a 
comparison of the rate at which white victim cases result in a death 
sentence to the rate at which black victim cases result in a death 
sentence at a particular level of aggravation. This disaggregates the 
overall selection rates and disparity reported in Table 2 by level of 
aggravation. If the disparity can be explained by disparate levels of 





 136.  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 137.  This measure has been used in previous studies and by state courts. See, e.g., 
Baldus et al., Analysis of the Nebraska Experience, supra note 76, at 534, 550–51 (noting 
that the number of statutory aggravating factors is both theoretically and practically 
relevant to evaluating the culpability of defendants); Baldus et al., Death Penalty in the 
Post-Furman Era, supra note 76, at 167 (noting that courts in New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania have applied this method). 
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Table 3: Measuring Disparities in the Rate at Which Cases Receive a Death 
Sentence, Controlling for the Race of Victim and Number of Statutory 
Aggravating Circumstances 







Rate by Race 
of Victim Ratio p 







    black victim 1.5% (15/980) 
  







    black victim 2.2% (17/772) 
  







    black victim 5.9% (22/373) 
  







    black victim 4.8% (14/291) 
  









    black victim 8.5% (22/258)   
 
However, the disparate selection rates persist. The selection rates 
by race of victim in Column E document that white victim cases are 
more likely to receive a death sentence at every level of aggravation. 
For cases with a single aggravating circumstance in Row 1 or two 
aggravating circumstances in Row 2, white victim cases are more than 
two times more likely to receive a death sentence than all others (p = 
.03 and p < .01). Cases at the mid-level of aggravation in Row 3 reflect 
a more modest disparity (1.3) in the same direction, but the disparity 
is not statistically significant. Surprisingly, however, in the four 
aggravating factors category, white victim cases are much more likely 
to receive a death sentence (ratio 3.6, p < .01), as are those in the five 
or more category (ratio 3.1, p < .01). 
While the white victim disparity weakens with the introduction 
of controls (from a relative risk of 4.0 to an average risk of 2.8), this 
disparity persists after controlling for the number of statutory 
aggravating circumstances in each case. The persistence of strong 
statistically significant disparities even at the highest level of 
aggravation is noteworthy (Lines 4 and 5). Harry Kalven, Jr. and 
Hanz Zeisel’s “liberation hypothesis” suggested that decision-makers 
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in the most and least aggravated cases are likely to be in the grip of 
fact and, therefore, somewhat immune from arbitrary and irrelevant 
case characteristics.138 In contrast, decision-makers in cases in the 
mid-range of aggravation are less likely to be in the grip of fact, and 
therefore, may more readily be influenced by arbitrary and irrelevant 
case characteristics, such as race.139 These results run counter to the 
liberation hypothesis by showing disparities across all levels of 
aggravation and particularly at the highest and lowest levels of 
aggravation. 
2.  Logistic Regression Analysis 
Logistic regression allows us to develop more complete models 
of decision-making, taking into consideration a full range of 
aggravating and mitigating evidence. Again, it is possible that more 
complete controls would explain the observed disparities. Table 4 
presents three logistic regression models of the overall decision to 
impose a death sentence. There are 285 death sentences among 1,381 
cases evaluated in this model. The weighted universe includes 4,929 
cases. 
As noted above, this analysis combines the effects of all decisions 
leading to a death sentence (“Death1”). The outcome variable asks 
only whether the case resulted in a death sentence. A case is coded 
“1” if it received a death sentence. All other cases are coded “0”. 
Column B presents a model relying only on culpability controls. The 
controls related to factors including statutory aggravating and 
mitigating factors, types of evidence and defenses, details of the 
crime, and method of killing. In Column C, the second model adds 
theoretically and statistically significant personal controls. The third 











 138.  Baldus et al., supra note 77, at 145 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, 
THE AMERICAN JURY 164–67 (1966)). 
 139.  Id. 
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Table 4: Logistic Regression Models Analyzing the Combined Effect of 
Charging and Sentencing Decisions 
 A B C D 
  Culpability Controls Culpability with 
Personal Controls 
Culpability with 
Personal and Context 
Controls 














 2.17 0.7762*** 2.00 0.6915** 2.01 0.6992** 
2. AggE2 10.74 2.3736*** 17.33 2.8526*** 19.91 2.9910*** 
3. AggE3 3.48 1.2455*** 2.99 1.0942*** 3.05 1.1147*** 
4. AggE8 7.16 1.9689*** 7.08 1.9574*** 6.70 1.9023*** 
5. AggE9 3.24 1.1750*** 3.34 1.2057*** 3.34 1.2043*** 
6. Disrobe 2.63 0.9649** 2.01 0.6972* 1.93 0.6581* 
7. EvidType3 2.39 0.8716* - - - - 
8. EvidType10 3.24 1.1741*** 3.11 1.1361*** 3.13 1.1408*** 
9. EvidType11 2.04 0.7111*** 2.08 0.7307*** 2.10 0.7427*** 
10. GratuitousFelony 2.43 0.8871** 2.06 0.7251* 2.05 0.7180* 
11. HeadWound 1.75 0.5585* 1.87 0.6267** 1.85 0.6126** 
12. Instigator 2.04 0.7108* 1.97 0.676* 2.02 0.7048* 
13. MoneyMotive 3.13 1.1413* 3.15 1.146* 2.95 1.0818* 
14. PleasureKill 2.60 0.9541** 2.69 0.9892** 2.63 0.9661** 
15. SeverePain 1.94 0.6642** 2.21 0.7938*** 2.20 0.7896*** 
16. Trauma 6.00 1.7921*** 5.42 1.6904*** 5.76 1.7505*** 
17. TwoVic 4.79 1.5663*** 4.60 1.5264*** 4.54 1.5128*** 
18. MitF4 0.12 -2.0990** 0.08 -2.5656** 0.07 -2.6112** 
19. CoPConflict 0.46 -0.7811* 0.40 -0.9154* 0.42 -0.8700* 
20. DefenseType1 0.20 -1.5990** 0.20 -1.5906* 0.21 -1.5432* 
21. DefenseType15 0.21 -1.5834*** 0.29 -1.2462*** 0.27 -1.3288*** 
22. DRage 0.33 -1.1111** 0.38 -0.9667** 0.39 -0.9550** 
23. NoSpAgg 0.93 -0.0715* 0.92 -0.0787* 0.92 -0.0854* 
24. ProvokeQ 0.28 -1.2769* 0.35 -1.0493* 0.36 -1.0310* 
25. TookResp 0.09 -2.4367*** 0.08 -2.4635*** 0.08 -2.4928*** 
26. VCriminal 0.28 -1.2714** 0.34 -1.085* 0.35 -1.0656* 
27. YoungDef 0.28 -1.2733** 0.24 -1.4193** 0.26 -1.3531** 
R2 = .69 (culpability) 
28. DVHome   0.40 -0.912* 0.41 -0.8970* 
29. FemVic   1.78 0.5772* 1.82 0.5977** 
30. VStranger   2.32 0.8402** 2.39 0.8720** 
R2 = .70 (with personal controls) 
31. VoteSplit1     1.05 0.0440* 
32. PercentBlack     1.02 0.0237* 
R2 = .71 (with personal and context controls) 
* ≤ .05, ** <.01, *** < .001 
† 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
The WhiteVic variable in Row 1 shows the odds ratio estimate 
and regression coefficient (with p-value indicated). This variable is 
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included to show the effect of having at least one white victim on the 
risk of receiving a death sentence. The primary model analyzing death 
sentencing among all death-eligible cases includes 26 other 
statistically and theoretically significant culpability controls. These 
variables include codes for individual statutory aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances where the statutory definitions best captured 
the nature of culpability or mitigation. In other instances, the control 
variables more precisely measure a factor otherwise included in a 
broader statutory aggravator. For example, TwoVic divides cases into 
two groups: single victim cases versus multiple victim cases. The 
felony murder aggravator captures the occurrence of a second 
homicide at the time of the murder but also references other violent 
homicides.140 The TwoVic variable provides a more precise measure 
of the kind of culpability at issue. In other instances, the variable 
measures a factor otherwise understood to be relevant to assessing 
the culpability of the offender or the crime, such as who instigated the 
murder or what types of evidence or defenses were available. 
The primary culpability model finds that white victim cases face 
odds of receiving a death sentence that are 2.17 times higher than the 
odds faced by all other cases (p < .001). This finding echoes the 2.96 
odds ratio reported by Radelet and Pierce in their study based on the 
FBI’s Supplement Homicide Reports.141 We would expect the 
additional controls in this study to explain part of the disparities 
reported in studies with more limited controls, as they do. Yet the 
identification of substantial statistically significant disparities based 
on the race of the victim across multiple studies lends credence to the 
suggestion that race of victim plays a significant role in charging and 
sentencing decisions. 
Thus, the first model shows that the race of the victim is 
practically and statistically significant. The only question for the 
second and third models in this table is whether some factor unrelated 
to culpability better explains the observed disparity than race alone. 
Column C shows that three personal variables were theoretically and 
statistically significant and are included in the culpability with 
personal controls model. Note that when these variables are included, 
EvidType 3 (the fact that the defendant was identified by a police 
officer) in Line 7 falls out of significance and is removed from the 
model. Even after controlling for the victim’s gender, the fact that the 
crime occurred in the defendant or co-defendant and victim’s home, 
 
 140.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-2000(e)(5) (2015). 
 141.  See Radelet & Pierce, supra note 5, at 2145. 
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and the fact that the victim was a stranger to the defendant, white 
victim cases face odds of receiving a death sentence that are 2.0 times 
higher than those faced by all others (p < .01). While these personal 
controls help explain part of the disparity, they do not provide an 
alternate explanation to race of the victim. 
Finally, the model presented in Column D adds 2 county-level 
context variables: one compares the level of political conservatism 
(“VoteSplit1”) and a second controls for the portion of the county 
population that was black (“PercentBlack”). These were the only 
context variables that even approached statistical significance. This 
model also included all of the control variables included in Column C. 
The WhiteVic variable in Line 1 shows that the context variables had 
very little impact on the influence of race of the victim disparities. As 
before, defendants in white victim cases face odds that are 2.0 times 
higher than those faced by defendants in black victim cases (p < .001). 
The overall statewide analysis of charging and sentencing 
decisions in death-eligible murder cases identified consistent 
disparities in the treatment of cases involving at least one white 
victim. These disparities appear in both unadjusted analyses and in 
adjusted procedures that control for defendants’ culpability. As noted 
above, this white victim disparity is consistent with disparities 
reported in earlier studies of North Carolina’s capital punishment 
system,142 as well as with studies in other jurisdictions during this time 
period.143 
This kind of analysis is useful in providing an overall picture of 
the death sentencing process, but it blurs the role of distinct decision-
makers and limits the ability to consider precise avenues to address 
observed disparities. The next two subsections present analyses by 
decision-makers. The first looks at prosecutorial decisions to bring a 
case to a capital trial. The second considers jury decisions to impose a 
death sentence at the penalty trial. 
 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  See, e.g., Baldus et al., United States Armed Forces, supra note 100, at 1270 tbl.4 
(odds ratio 2.5, p = .11); Michael J. Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and 
Location on Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S.C. 
L. REV. 161, 204 tbl.7 (2006) (odds ratio 3.16, p < .01); Marian R. Williams & Jefferson E. 
Holcomb, Racial Disparity and Death Sentences in Ohio, 29 J. CRIM. JUST. 207, 216, 215 
tbl.3 (2001) (odds ratio 1.66, p < .01). 
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B. Analysis of Prosecutorial Decision to Advance Death-Eligible 
Homicide Cases to a Capital Trial 
Prosecutors in North Carolina bring death-eligible homicides to a 
capital trial in about 13% of the cases (656/4,924).144 The question at 
this stage of analysis is whether the white victim disparities observed 
in overall death sentencing can be traced to the charging decisions. 
The stage-wise analysis suggests what might appear to be the opposite 
story from the overall conclusions. In addition to preferential 
charging and sentencing of white victim cases, these data suggest that 
cases taking place within the black community, where black 
defendants kill only black victims, advance to a capital trial at 
significantly and practically lower rates than all other cases. In fact, 
the fully controlled model suggests that the de-selection of black 
defendant/black victim cases best captures the role of race in the 
charging decision rather than the preferred selection of white victim 
cases. 
Although this finding that prosecutors are less likely to bring 
death-eligible defendants within the black community to a capital trial 
has not previously been reported in a charging and sentencing study 
of which we are aware, it is consistent with findings in related 
research. John Blume and colleagues analyzed the demographics of 
death row by comparing murder and death sentence data, seeking to 
understand why blacks are underrepresented on death row.145 They 
concluded that blacks who murder blacks are underrepresented on 
death row in part “due to the evidence of prosecutorial reluctance to 
seek death in ‘black on black’ cases.”146 More recently, Frank 
Baumgartner and his colleagues studied every execution since 1976 
and reported that black victim’s cases are “vastly underrepresented 
among victims of those executed” and suggested, based on this 
finding, that race-of-victim bias “can work	.	.	.	to decrease the 
perceived seriousness of crimes against Black victims.”147 
 
 144.  See infra Table 5. 
 145.  See John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg, & Martin T. Wells, Explaining Death 
Row’s Population and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 168 (2004). 
See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715 (2006) 
(reviewing the literature and examining the sociolegal implications for 
“underenforcement” of crimes against the poor, racial minorities, and the otherwise 
politically vulnerable). 
 146.  Blume, Eisenberg, & Wells, supra note 145, at 192, 202–03. 
 147.  Frank R. Baumgartner, Amanda Grigg & Alisa Mastro, #BlackLivesDon’tMatter: 
Race-of-Victim Effects in US Executions, 1976–2013, 3 POL., GROUPS, & IDENTITIES 209, 
215–16 (2015). 
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1.  Comparative Selection Rates-Controlling for Race of Victim and 
for Black Defendant/Black Victim Cases 
Table 5 presents the unadjusted selection rates at which 
prosecutors bring cases to a capital trial. Line 1 shows that white 
victim cases remain significantly more likely to face a capital trial than 
cases with only black victims. The relative risk that white victim cases 
will be brought to a capital trial is 2.1 (18.6%/8.9%, p < .0001). These 
rates show an even larger disparity than seen overall with a 9.7-point 
selection rate difference in charging compared to a 4.4-point 
difference in overall death sentencing (Table 5, Line 1, Column D 
versus Table 3, Column E). 
A larger difference in selection rates for black defendant/black 
victim cases versus all others, however, provided the first suggestion 
of an alternative understanding of the role of race in this stage. Line 2 
focuses on cases in which black defendants killed only black victims, 
showing that these cases faced one-half the risk faced by all other 
cases of advancing to a capital trial (0.5, p < .0001). Prosecutors bring 
black defendant/black victim cases to a capital trial 8.5% of the time 
(217/2,565). In contrast, prosecutors bring all other cases to a capital 
trial 18.6% of the time (439/2,359). These rates demonstrate a 10.1-
point difference in the relative risk of a capital trial. This suggests that 
most of the disparity reported in Line 1, between white victim cases 
and black victim cases, can be traced more precisely to black 
defendant/black victim cases. 
 
Table 5: Statewide Unadjusted Rate at Which Cases Advance to Capital 
Trial by Race of Victim and Combined Race of Defendant and Victim 
 A B C D E F 
  % n Difference Ratio p 
1. White victim 18.6% 418/2,249 9.7 pts. 2.1 <.0001 




8.5% 217/2,565 -10.1 pts. 0.5 <.0001 
3. All other 18.6% 439/2,359    
4. Overall rate 13.3% 656/4,924    
 
As before, these disparities fail to account for the relative 
culpability of different cases but provide a starting suggestion that 
race may play some role in charging practices. The next analyses 
explore how charging decisions and prosecutorial discretion to pursue 
a capital trial is affected by aggravating circumstances. 
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Table 6 considers the likelihood that a death-eligible case will 
advance to a capital guilt trial controlling for the number of 
aggravating circumstances in the case and the race of the victim. 
Charging practices appear to relate rationally to the number of 
aggravating circumstances in the case. As the number of aggravating 
circumstances increases from Row 1 to Row 5, the likelihood that a 
case will advance to a capital trial, in Column B, increases in steps 
from 7.7% to 29%. 
 
Table 6: Measuring Disparities in the Rate at Which Cases Advance to a 
Capital Trial, Controlling for the Race of the Victim and Number of 
Statutory Aggravating Circumstances 





n Race of 
Victim 
Rate by Race 
of Victim 
Ratio p 







    black victim  6.2% (61/980) 
  



















    black victim 11.5% (43/373) 
  





















    black victim  19.0% (49/258)   
 
Columns D through G separate the cases by race of victim and 
level of aggravation. Again, white victim cases advance to capital 
trials at a higher rate than black victim cases at every level of 
aggravation, but the disparities generally are not as large as those 
observed in the overall death sentencing analysis. At the first level, 
cases with one aggravating circumstance, white victim cases advance 
to a capital trial at 1.6 times the rate of black victim cases (p < .02). 
This disparity increases to 2.2 at the second level (p < .01) but then 
decreases to 1.5 and falls to marginal significance at the third level 
(p	= .06). As before, the fourth and fifth levels show increased levels 
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of disparities and statistical significance. White victim cases with four 
aggravating circumstances are 3.4 times more likely to advance to a 
capital trial than black victim cases (p	<	.01), which mirrors the 
disparity observed at this level of aggravation in the overall death-
sentencing analysis. White victim cases with five or more aggravating 
circumstances are more than twice as likely (2.1) to advance to a 
capital trial as black victim cases (p < .01). Controlling for the number 
of aggravating circumstances in the case does not eliminate the white 
victim disparities. 
 
Table 7: Measuring Disparities in the Rate at Which Black Defendant/Black 
Victim (“BDBV”) Cases Advance to a Capital Trial, Controlling for the 
Number of Statutory Aggravating Circumstances 







Rate by Race 
of Victim Ratio p 



















    other 15.3% (99/647) 
  



















    other 34.9% (68/195) 
  









   
 other 
 40.2% 
(103/256)   
 
Table 7 evaluates whether the same findings apply with respect 
to black defendant/black victim disparities. Column B replicates 
Table 6, Column B, showing the increasing rate at which prosecutors 
bring a case to a capital trial as the number of aggravators increases 
from Line 1 to Line 5. Columns D through G divide the cases into 
black defendant/black victim cases versus all other cases at each level 
of aggravation. Again, cases in which a black defendant killed only 
black victims are significantly less likely to be brought to a capital 
trial than all other cases at every level of aggravation. The largest 
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disparity appears at the lowest level of aggravation (Level 1), where 
black defendant/black victim cases are 60% less likely to be brought 
to a capital trial (p < .01). At Level 2, black defendant/black victim 
cases face a relative risk of 0.4 (p < .01). At Level 3, which did not 
show statistically significant disparities in the identical white victim 
analyses, selection rates show a statistically significant relative risk of 
0.6. The disparity persists at similar rates in Levels 4 and 5 (0.3 and 
0.4, respectively, p < .01 for each). 
The simple statutory controls imposed in Tables 6 and 7 show 
that the disparate treatment of white victim cases and of black 
defendant/black victim cases cannot be explained simply as a result of 
the nature of the death-eligible homicides involved. Even at the 
highest level of aggravation, with four or five or more statutory 
aggravating factors present in the case, these cases face different 
outcomes based on race. 
2.  Logistic Regression Analysis 
Again, logistic regression allows us to control for a broad range 
of factors relating to the culpability of the defendant and the 
circumstances of the crime. Table 8 presents three logistic regression 
models of the prosecutorial decision to bring a death-eligible murder 
case to trial seeking a death sentence. Because of the disparities 
reported above, we continued to analyze the importance of all race 
variables in logistic analyses of this outcome variable. Analysis of 
every control variable and every subgroup of control variables 
considered the practical and statistical significance of each variable 
when controlling for all possible combinations of mainline race effects 
(race of defendant or race of victim), possible interaction race effects 
(black defendant/black victim, white defendant/white victim, black 
defendant/white victim, white defendant/black victim), and without 
race controls. This analysis demonstrated that the failure to bring 
black defendant/black victim cases to capital trials best explains the 
race effects observed in this decision. This variable consistently 
stepped in over the white victim case variable and excluded all other 
race variables. For that reason, the fully specified models presented 
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Table 8: Logistic Regression Models Analyzing the Decision to Bring a Case 
to a Capital Trial 
 A B C D 
  Culpability Controls Culpability with 
Personal Controls 
Culpability with 
Personal and Context 
Controls 












1. BDBV† 0.39 -0.9385*** 0.39 -0.9470*** 0.38 -0.9726*** 
2. AggE3 2.18 0.7794** 2.06 0.7246** 2.03 0.7104** 
3. AggE8 8.52 2.1421*** 6.80 1.9163** 7.33 1.9914** 
4. AddCrime 2.63 0.9680*** 2.46 0.8999*** 2.63 0.9661*** 
5. EvidType1 2.43 0.8870* 2.51 0.9208* 2.47 0.9053* 
6. EvidType3 4.00 1.3873*** 4.18 1.4298*** 4.37 1.4748*** 
7. EvidType8 1.74 0.5524* 1.77 0.5687* 1.83 0.6072* 
8. EvidType10 2.79 1.0274*** 2.68 0.9867*** 2.75 1.0102*** 
9. Fugitive 4.64 1.5345*** 5.11 1.6319*** 4.15 1.4241*** 
10. HeadWound 1.99 0.6885** 2.01 0.6966** 2.02 0.7012** 
11. ManyWound 2.42 0.8821** 2.16 0.7678** 2.16 0.7697** 
12. MoneyMotive 2.72 0.9987* 2.85 1.0462* 2.7160 0.9992* 
13. PleasureKill 5.22 1.6519*** 4.59 1.5240** 5.16 1.6405*** 
14. PreArmed 1.86 0.6226*** 1.93 0.6555** 1.92 0.6501** 
15. PriorThreat 2.13 0.7546* 2.54 0.9339** 2.62 0.9642*** 
16. SeverePain 3.08 1.1249*** 2.96 1.0833*** 3.19 1.1594*** 
17. Trauma 20.46 3.0185*** 20.32 3.0113*** 20.37 3.0138*** 
18. TwoVic 3.38 1.2172*** 2.93 1.0751** 2.86 1.0493** 
19. DefenseType5 0.36 -1.0165** 0.37 -0.9932* 0.36 -1.0102* 
20. DefenseType14 0.11 -2.2027*** 0.09 -2.3613*** 0.09 -2.3648*** 
21. DefenseType15 0.38 -0.9619** 0.44 -0.8130* 0.47 -0.7528* 
22. DRage 0.46 -0.7730* 0.50 -0.6985* 0.50 -0.6943* 
23. EvidType5 0.38 -0.9781*** 0.36 -1.0177*** 0.35 -1.0548*** 
24. EvidType12 0.29 -1.2298*** 0.32 -1.1326*** 0.32 -1.1497*** 
25. GangLoyalty 0.17 -1.7802** 0.17 -1.7906* 0.18 -1.6972* 
26. HateRev 0.49 -0.7241** 0.58 -0.5514* 0.55 -0.5976 
27. NoLongPlan 0.91 -0.0912** 0.92 -0.0886** 0.91 -0.0892** 
28. NoSpAgg 0.92 -0.0825* 0.91 -0.0917* 0.92 -0.0822* 
29. ResidDoubt 0.21 -1.5740* 0.26 -1.3652* 0.27 -1.3122* 
30. TookResp 0.06 -2.7957*** 0.07 -2.7339*** 0.06 -2.7881*** 
R2 = .83 
31. DVHome   0.30 -1.1971** 0.31 -1.1710** 
32. FemVic   1.95 0.6700** 1.88 0.6309** 
R2 = .83 
33. Poverty     0.61 -0.4893* 
R2 = .84 
* ≤ .05, ** <.01, *** < .001 
† 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
 
The outcome variable in this model, CASeek, codes the fact of 
advancing to a capital trial. A case is coded “1” if it advanced to a 
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capital trial. All other cases are coded “0”. There are 642 capital trials 
among 1,380 cases evaluated in these models. The weighted universe 
estimates 4,924 cases. As previously, the first model, Column B, 
includes only culpability controls. The second, Column C, adds 
theoretically and statistically significant personal controls. The third, 
Column D, adds theoretically and statistically significant context 
controls. The race variable BDBV appears in Row 1. This variable is 
coded “1” if the case involves a black defendant and only black 
victims. All other cases are coded “0”. 
The culpability model, Column B, finds that black 
defendant/black victim cases face odds of advancing to a capital trial 
that are 0.39 times lower than the odds faced by all other cases (p < 
.001), even after controlling for all theoretically and statistically 
significant culpability control variables. In Column C, two personal 
control variables met the model specification requirements: the fact 
that the crime happened in the defendant or co-defendant and 
victim’s home and that the victim was a woman. Including these 
variables in the model does not change the odds that a prosecutor will 
bring a black defendant/black victim case to a capital trial (odds ratio 
0.39, p < .01). Finally, the model reported in Column D includes one 
context variable, controlling for per capita personal income. Including 
this variable in the model only very slightly lowers the odds that a 
prosecutor will bring a black defendant/black victim case to a capital 
trial (odds ratio 0.38, p < .01). 
C. Analysis of Jury Decision to Issue a Death Sentence at the Penalty 
Trial 
Juries in North Carolina during the study period imposed a death 
sentence in 44.5% of penalty trials (286/643). As noted above, the 
database contains the universe of cases that advanced to a penalty 
trial between 1990 and 2009. We identified 643 penalty trials in this 
period. Table 9 shows the race of defendants and victims in these 
cases: 272 white defendant cases, 371 black defendant cases, 413 white 
victim cases, and 230 black victim cases. White defendant/white victim 
cases constitute the largest defendant/victim subset. 
Importantly, the reluctance of prosecutors to bring black 
defendant/black victim cases to capital trials changes the demographic 
profile of the cases that advance to a penalty trial. White defendant 
cases and white victim cases represent a higher proportion of penalty 
trial cases. Table 9, Line 1, shows that white defendant cases 
constitute 31% of the estimated universe and 42% of penalty trials. 
Even more dramatically, in Line 3, white victim cases move from 45% 
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of the estimated universe to 64% of penalty trial cases. This results 
directly from prosecutorial decisions not to advance black 
defendant/black victim cases to capital trials as discussed above. 
Indeed, black victim cases fall from 55% of the estimated universe to 
36% of penalty trials, and black defendant/black victim cases fall from 
53% to 32%, respectively. 
 
Table 9: Representation Rates Across Stages 
 A B C D 
  Estimated Universe Penalty Trial Cases Death Sentenced Cases 
  n % n % n % 
1. White 
defendant 
1,865 31% 272 42% 133 46% 
2. Black 
defendant 
4,204 69% 371 58% 153 53% 
3. White victim 2,733 45% 413 64% 196 68% 
















130 2% 21 3% 5 2% 
9. TOTAL 6,069  643  286  
 
This artifact of prosecutorial selection impacts the universe at 
this stage. Figure 1 presents the distribution of death-eligible cases by 
number of aggravating circumstances in three subsets: (1) the non-
black defendant/black victim cases in the estimated universe (i.e., all 
other cases) (light grey); (2) the black defendant/black victim cases in 
the estimated universe (“BDBV universe”) (white); and (3) the black 
defendant/black victim cases reaching a penalty trial (“BDBV penalty 
trial”) (dark grey). The BDBV penalty trial cases appear more 
aggravated than either of the other subsets. For example, 18% of 
BDBV penalty trial cases (37/208) have five or more aggravating 
circumstances as compared to 10% of BDBV universe (254/2,564) or 
11% of all other cases (256/2,360). Likewise, 15% of BDBV penalty 
trial cases have four aggravating circumstances (31/208) compared to 
11% of BDBV universe cases (284/2,564) or 8% of all other cases 
(196/2,360). 
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Figure 1. Comparison of Distribution by Number of Aggravating 
Circumstances of Non-BDBV Death-Eligible Cases to Distribution of 
BDBV Cases in (1) the Estimated Universe of Death-Eligible Homicides 
and (2)	the Universe of Cases Reaching a Penalty Trial 
 
The same pattern appears at the other end of the scale. Fewer of 
the BDBV penalty trial cases have one or two aggravating factors 
(27% (57/208) and 21% (44/208), respectively) than do BDBV 
universe cases (37% (947/2,564) and 28% (716/2,564), respectively) or 
all other cases (32% (745/2,360) and 28% (651/2,360), respectively). 
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion at the charging phase 
means that jurors faced a universe in which to make penalty trial 
decisions that differed in racial demographics from the universe faced 
by prosecutors when making charging decisions. Stagewise analysis, 
like that presented here, allows us to limit the analysis to the actual 
universe of cases jurors faced, i.e., the penalty trial universe and to 
focus on a single decision made in each case by the jury-the decision 
to issue a death sentence or not. 
1.  Comparative Selection Rates 
The rates at which different racial subsets of cases receive a 
death sentence at a penalty trial are reported in Table 10. Note that 
four of the six racial subsets report statistically significant or 






























Number of Statutory Aggravating Factors in Case 
All Other Cases BDBV Universe BDBV Penalty Trial
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the few cases in which a white defendant killed only black victims. In 
unadjusted analyses, cases in this subset faced a considerably lower 
risk of receiving a death sentence than all other cases reaching a 
penalty trial. Five of these twenty-one cases resulted in a death 
sentence: 24% compared to 45% (281/622) of the remaining cases. 
White defendant/black victim cases face 52% of the risk faced by 
other cases. This disparity only approaches statistical significance (p	= 
.07) perhaps because of the small sample size. The remaining 
disparities suggest that defendants in white victim cases (line 1), white 
defendants (line 2), and white defendants with white victims (line 5) 
face a significantly higher risk of receiving a death sentence. 
 
Table 10: Selection Rates-Percent of Cases in Each Subject Receiving a 
Death Sentence at Penalty Trial 
 A B C D E F 
  % n Difference Ratio p 
1. White victim 47.5% 196/413 8.4 pts. 1.21 .05 
 Black victim 39.1% 90/230    
2. Black defendant 41.2% 153/371 -7.7 pts. 0.84 .05 
 White defendant 48.9% 133/272    
3. Black defendant/ 
black victim 
40.7% 85/209 -5.6 pts. 0.88 .20 
 All other 46.3% 201/434    
4. Black defendant/ 
white victim 
42.0% 68/162 -3.3 pts.  0.93 .47 
 All other 45.3% 218/481    
5. White defendant/ 
white victim 
51.0% 128/251 10.7 pts. 1.26 <.01 
 All other 40.3% 158/392    
6. White defendant/ 
black victim 
23.8% 5/21 -21.4 pts. 0.53 .07 
 All other 45.2% 281/622    
7. Overall rate 44.5% 286/643    
 
The small number of white defendant/black victim cases 
precludes analysis of the impact of the number of aggravating 
circumstances on disparities. Table 11 shows this analysis by race of 
victim. In this situation, controlling for the number of aggravators in 
the case causes the observed disparities to fall out of statistical 
significance and in two instances (Line 3 and 4) to decrease or 
reverse. These results suggest that the observed disparities in 
treatment of white victim cases may be explained by different levels 
of culpability. 
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Table 11: Measuring Disparities in the Rate at Which Cases Receive a 
Death Sentence at a Penalty Trial, Controlling for Race of Victim and 
Number of Statutory Aggravating Circumstances 







Rate by Race 
of Victim Ratio p 







    black victim 24.6% (15/61) 
  







    black victim 32.1% (17/53) 
  







    black victim 51.2% (22/43) 
  







    black victim 45.2% (14/31) 
  









    black victim 53.7% (22/41)   
 
2.  Logistic Regression Analysis 
Logistic regression analyses allow for consideration of a broader 
range of culpability factors. In a fully controlled logistic regression 
(shown in Table 12), the white defendant/black victim variable steps 
into the model first and to the exclusion of any other race variable. 
This variable is coded “1” if the defendant is white and all victims are 
black. Otherwise it is coded “0”. These twenty-one cases face odds of 
receiving a death sentence that are less than 20% of those faced by all 






 148.  The opposite of this story provides a different perspective. If we limit the penalty 
trial database to black victim cases, black defendants face odds of receiving a death 
sentence at a penalty trial that are 4.9 times higher than those faced by white defendants 
(p < .05) in a fully specific logistic regression model. 
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Table 12: Logistic Regression Model of Jury Decision to Impose Death at 
Penalty Trial 
 A B C 
  Odds Ratio Estimate Regression Coefficient 
1. WDBV† 0.19 -1.6573* 
2. AggE3 2.89 1.0609*** 
3. AggE7 5.62 1.7269** 
4. AggE9 4.52 1.5075*** 
5. AssaultGun 8.23 2.1078** 
6. Disrobe 3.04 1.1115*** 
7. Execution 1.81 0.5931** 
8. NumVicScale 1.74 0.5547* 
9. MitF4 0.05 -3.0207*** 
10. MitF6 0.31 -1.1814*** 
11. MitF7 0.27 -1.3028*** 
12. ContributePris 0.42 -0.8681*** 
13. DefenseType1 0.26 -1.3337* 
14. DRage 0.51 -0.6698* 
15. DselfD 0.16 -1.8346** 
16. HateRev 0.50 -0.6882** 
R2 = .44  
* ≤ .05, ** <.01, *** < .001 
† 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
The consistent importance of the white defendant/black victim 
cases led us to look at these cases qualitatively to evaluate whether 
factors that escaped quantitative analyses could explain the 
overwhelming disparities in treatment. The primary researchers 
reviewed the narrative summaries for every white defendant/black 
victim case. The coding team prepared these summaries as they coded 
the DCIs. The primary researchers also had access to the documents 
in the electronic case file where the narrative required clarification. 
This review did not identify any reason the culpability of these cases 
would not be controlled accurately by the model or suggest any 
explanation for this distinct treatment. 
If we treat these cases as outliers and exclude them from the 
analysis of this outcome variable we find no evidence of race effects 
at penalty trial. No race variables approach practical or statistical 
significance in logistic regression. Table 13 shows the race of 
defendant variable reports an odds ratio of 0.89 with a p-value of 0.60. 
These findings echo research suggesting the white 
defendant/black victim cases are underrepresented on death row and 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1997 (2016) 
2042 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
among executions.149 The lack of other race findings is also consistent 
with findings reported by Jennings and colleagues in their study of 
North Carolina penalty trials.150 
 
Table 13: Logistic Regression Model of Jury Decision to Impose Death at 
Penalty Trial Excluding 21 Cases in Which a White Defendant Killed a 
Black Victim 
 A B C 
  Odds Ratio Estimate Regression Coefficient 
1. DefB† 0.89 -0.1152 (p = .60) 
2. AggE3 3.00 1.0974*** 
3. AggE7 6.17 1.8190** 
4. AggE9 4.53 1.5111*** 
5. AssaultGun 10.13 2.3150** 
6. Disrobe 2.84 1.0450** 
7. Execution 1.70 0.5310* 
8. GratuitousAttack 2.22 0.7979** 
9. NumVicScale 1.82 0.5972* 
10. MitF4 0.05 -3.0755*** 
11. MitF6 0.26 -1.3352*** 
12. MitF7 0.26 -1.3644*** 
13. ContributePris 0.39 -0.9451*** 
14. DefenseType1 0.23 -1.4622* 
15. DRage 0.35 -1.0535** 
16. DselfD 0.03 -3.5093** 
17. HateRev 0.53 -0.6332* 
R2 = .49  
* ≤ .05, ** <.01, *** < .001 
† 











 149.  Baumgartner et al., supra note 147, at 211–12. 
 150.  Jennings et al., A Critical Examination, supra note 59, at 384. 
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CONCLUSION 
The RJA asked whether race played a significant role in 
decisions to seek or impose a death sentence in North Carolina 
capital cases. This research demonstrates that from 1990–2000, race 
was a statistically significant factor in each of those considerations. 
Further, our research untangles the conflicting ways in which race 
impacted these decisions. Our findings relate to three racial 
subgroups: 
1. White Victim Cases: Cases in which the defendant killed at 
least one white victim were significantly more likely to 
receive a death sentence than cases in which the defendant 
killed only black victims (odds 2.17, p < .01). 
2. Black Defendant/Black Victim Cases: Prosecutors were 
significantly less likely to bring cases in which black 
defendants killed only black victims to a capital trial than 
any other case (odds ratio 0.39, p < .01). 
3. White Defendant/Black Victim Cases: Juries were 
significantly less likely to sentence defendants to death in 
cases where white defendants kill only black victims than 
any other case (odds ratio 0.19, p < .05). No race effects 
remain once the white defendant/black victim cases are 
excluded from the analysis. 
This study did not identify any evidence of race-of-defendant 
discrimination or evidence that black defendants who killed white 
victims faced more punitive treatment. However, our findings are 
consistent with findings from similar studies in North Carolina and 
nationally.151 First, the race of the victim exercises a substantial 
impact on the likelihood that a death sentence will be reached. 
Defendants who killed at least one white victim faced more than 
twice the odds of receiving a death sentence than those defendants 
who killed no white victims. Second, at the charging stage, we find 
that prosecutors are significantly less likely to bring cases involving 
black defendants and black victims to a capital trial than they are any 
other racial combination. This effect persists even when we take into 
consideration county-level factors like those Eisenberg examined to 
explain the underrepresentation of black-on-black murder cases on 
death row.152 Finally, at the sentencing stage, juries were significantly 
less likely to sentence white defendants who killed only black victims 
 
 151.  See supra Part II. 
 152.  See Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 359. 
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to death, but any race effects disappeared when we excluded this 
relatively small number of cases from the analysis. 
These findings pull in opposite directions in a manner that brings 
to mind the research on the racial composition of death row’s 
population by Blume and colleagues.153 That study, based on twenty-
three years of murder and death sentencing data, concluded that race 
“plays a substantial role in the administration of the death penalty, 
but it tugs in two different directions.”154 The treatment of white 
victim cases and black defendant/black victim cases pull strongly in 
opposite directions in capital charging and sentencing in North 
Carolina between 1990 and 2009. Our study works to illuminate these 
disparate effects. 
 
 153.  See Blume, Eisenberg, & Wells, supra note 145, at 165. 
 154.  Id. at 190–92 (identifying the two directions as an increased risk of a death 
sentence for black defendants who kill white victims versus a decreased risk of a death 
sentence for black defendants who kill black victims). 
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Variable Name Explanation 
1 AggE2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-2000(e)(2) (2015). Defendant 
previously committed a capital felony.   
2 AggE3 N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-2000(e)(3) (2015). Defendant 
previously convicted of a violent felony.   
3 AggE7 N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-2000(e)(7) (2015). Murder 
committed to hinder a governmental function or the 
enforcement of law.   
4 AggE8 N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-2000(e)(8) (2015). Murder 
committed against law enforcement officer, employee of 
the Department of Correction, jailer, fireman, judge or 
justice, former judge or justice, prosecutor or former 
prosecutor, juror or former juror, or witness against the 
defendant, while engaged in performance of his official 
duties or because of the exercise of his official duty.  
5 AggE9 N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-2000(e)(9) (2015). Murder was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.   
6 AddCrime Defendant charged with at least one additional crime. 
7 AssaultGun Defendant shot victim with an assault rifle. 
8 BDBV Case involved a black defendant and all black victims. 
9 ContributePris Defendant has potential to contribute to prison life. 
10 CoPConflict Case evidence suggests credibility problems of co-
defendant or witness who received consideration in his 
or her own pending criminal case who testified for the 
state. 
11 DAddict Evidence in the record suggested that the defendant 
was addicted to a drug or alcohol around the time of the 
offense. 
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Variable Name Explanation 
12 DefenseType1 Insufficient evidence to prove defendant’s culpability or 
conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. 
13 DefenseType5 Defendant played a less substantial role than 
competitor. 
14 DefenseType14 Insanity. 
15 DefenseType15 Lack of mens rea because of mental illness or 
intoxication. 
16 DefB Defendant is a racial minority. 
17 Disrobe Victim or a non-decedent victim was forced to disrobe or 
was disrobed by perpetrator (in whole or in part). 
18 DRage Defendant acted in rage. 
19 DselfD Defendant acted in perceived self-defense. 
20 DVHome Homicide occurred in residence of victim and defendant 
or co-defendant. 
21 EvidType1 Pretrial identification of the defendant occurred. 
22 EvidType3 Defendant identified by a police officer. 
23 EvidType5 Defendant confessed to murder. 
24 EvidType8 Weapon found linking defendant to murder. 
25 EvidType10 Physical evidence specifically linking defendant to 
murder. 
26 EvidType11 Testimony of primary witness was corroborated. 
27 EvidType12 Defendant had a motive to commit murder. 
28 Execution Execution-style homicide (homicide against a subdued 
or passive victim). 
29 FemVic At least one victim was female. 
30 Fugitive File at least suggests that defendant was a fugitive from a 
prior violent felony crime. 
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Variable Name Explanation 
31 GangLoyalty Defendant motivated at least partly by loyalty to gang 
member or associate. 
32 GratuitousAttack File at least suggests that defendant continued or 
resumed a painful attack on a decedent victim after it 
was apparent the victim was dying. 
33 GratuitousFelony Case involved a contemporaneous felony and homicide 
that was unnecessary to complete the crime to the point 
of being gratuitous. 
34 HateRev Crime motivated by long-term hatred of victim or 
revenge for prior harm to defendant or another. 
35 HeadWound Victim received wounds to the head. 
36 Instigator Defendant instigated the offense (if there were co-
perpetrators). 
37 ManyWound Victim suffered many wounds. 
38 MitF4 N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-2000(f)(4) (2015). Defendant 
was an accomplice in or accessory to a murder 
committed by another person, and the defendant’s 
participation was relatively minor.  
39 MitF6 N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-2000(f)(6) (2015). Defendant’s 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of the conduct or 
to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law 
was impaired.   
40 MitF7 N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-2000(f)(7) (2015). Defendant’s 
age at the time of the murder.   
41 MoneyMotive Defendant motivated at least partly by the ability to 
acquire money in the killing (contract kill, insurance 
proceeds, inheritance). 
42 NoLongPlan Homicide was not planned for more than five minutes.   
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Variable Name Explanation 
43 NoSpAgg None of the special aggravators attributable to 
defendant are present in the case. These include lying in 
wait, lack of remorse, expressions of pleasure with 
homicide, resisting arrest, escape, previous attempt to 
murder victim, announcement of intent to kill victim in 
advance to third party, hiding victim, and similar 
behavior. 
44 NumVicScale A three-level scale based on the number of victims in the 
case. 1 = 1 victim; 2 = 2 or 3 victims; 3 = 4 or more 
victims. 
45 PercentBlack A continuous variable based on the percent of black 
residents by county and year.   
46 PleasureKill File at least suggests that defendant expressed pleasure 
with the homicide. 
47 Poverty Comparison North Carolina median income to median 
income in county for each year of study. If county 
median income is less than state median income, poverty 
= 1. Otherwise, poverty = 0. Codes assigned to individual 
cases by county and year of sentencing. 
48 PreArmed Defendant or co-perpetrator came to the scene of the 
crime with the weapon ultimately used to kill the victim. 
49 PriorThreat File at least suggests that defendant threatened victim in 
victim’s presence to kill victim’s family members or 
others who were close to victim, or announced in 
advance to a third person an intention to kill the victim. 
50 ProvokeQ Other disputes and fights where it is unknown who 
provoked the altercations. 
51 ResidDoubt Evidence suggests residual doubt about guilt. 
52 SeverePain Victim suffered severe physical pain. 
53 TookResp Defendant took responsibility for the offense (other than 
confession to capital murder). 
54 Trauma Defendant suffered physical or psychological trauma 
(e.g., brain injuries or observing a parent be killed). 
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Variable Name Explanation 
55 TwoVic Case involved more than one victim. 
56 VCriminal Victim had a bad criminal reputation or a criminal 
record. 
57 VoteSplit1 This measure averaged the percent of voters voting for 
the Republican candidate in 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 
and 2008 in each county to create a continuous variable. 
Codes assigned to individual cases by county. 
58 VStranger Defendant did not know victim before the murder. 
59 WDBV Case involved white defendant and all black victims. 
60 WhiteVic Case involved at least one white victim. 
























94 N.C. L. REV. 1997 (2016) 
2050 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
 
 
